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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to explain welfare and labor market participation 
differentials between Saskatchewan and Alberta, with greater emphasis placed on 
welfare participation. Generous benefit levels encourage welfare participation but 
discourage labor market participation. We are interested in explaining if generous 
welfare policy has contributed to an increase in welfare participation and discouraged 
labor market participation. We employ a probit model to analyze the decision to 
participate in the welfare or the labor market among lone parents and singles (unattached 
individuals) in the two provinces. The results are then decomposed into the explained 
and unexplained parts, and these results are used to illustrate which variables contribute 
to welfare differentials.  
We find that benefit levels have a significant positive effect on welfare 
participation and a significant negative effect on labor market participation. We also find 
that welfare participation differentials exist between Saskatchewan and Alberta; other 
factors in addition to benefit levels play a role in explaining that gap. We conclude that 
welfare differentials between Saskatchewan may be a reflection of program 
administration differences. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Social Assistance (SA) or Income Assistance (IA) is a complex issue that 
provokes a range of emotions among recipients, policy makers, and the public in general. 
Those receiving assistance are grateful for the support it provides, but they often feel 
stigmatized by their utilization of welfare and hope to become self-reliant and improve 
their standard of living. Taxpayers and politicians, on the other hand, realize that social 
assistance is a necessary part of the social safety net, but they are disturbed by the 
possibility that the system encourages dependence and discourages work effort.   
Significant changes have occurred in welfare programs both in the US and 
Canada. Faced with increasing welfare caseloads, social spending and a decrease in 
federal funding, most provincial governments turned to welfare reform. Consequently, 
there was an increase in policy debates centered around the effect of these policies on 
governments spending and the people they were trying to affect.  
The fundamental issue in welfare reform discussions is to discourage welfare 
dependency by diverting individuals or families to other resources for help. In addition, 
for employable individuals, welfare is not supposed to be a source of income but rather a 
support program towards self-sufficiency. This was the motivation behind welfare 
reforms in the early 1990s in the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta.  
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Ontario introduced reforms such as Ontario Works to encourage welfare recipients to 
join the labor market; Alberta, on the other hand, introduced Supports for Independence 
(SFI) in 1992 to replace the social allowance program in existence. The program did not 
come into effect until 1993; it was to act as an active employment program by providing 
resources that would assist individuals to get paid employment. However, Saskatchewan 
was reluctant in implementing changes until the summer of 1998 when the government 
acted after a lot of pressure from other politicians and the public at large. The 
government came up with a new initiative, Building Independence-Investing in Families. 
This initiative is focused on improving family incomes and decreasing child poverty. All 
these proposals mentioned have achieved some success but not without a lot of 
criticisms from welfare activists.  
This study was motivated by an article released by Canada Newswire in 
Vancouver, January 16, 2003. The article was in reference to a paper published by Jason 
Clemens and Chris Schafer in November 2002 entitled Welfare in Saskatchewan: a 
Critical Analysis; Clemens and Schafer are research fellows at the Fraser Institute. The 
authors criticized the Saskatchewan welfare policy arguing that it is in need of major 
changes to reduce welfare caseloads, increase employment and earnings of welfare 
recipients. Furthermore, the article indicated that Saskatchewan should try to replicate 
and implement welfare policies available in Alberta, Ontario and some US States. Hence 
the decision to do a study on welfare and labor market participation decisions on 
Saskatchewan and Alberta; Saskatchewan and Alberta are similar in some ways and it 
will be interesting to find out how these issues interact in the two provinces. The study 
intends to compare how welfare policy and other variable constraints contribute to or 
discourage welfare and labor market participation in the two provinces.   
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In this paper I intend to apply joint bivariate and individual binary probit models 
of welfare and labor market participation. The bivariate employs the same methodology 
used by Christofides et al (1997) using a different data set (Survey of Consumer 
Finances) for the periods 1986-1997.  In this study I will consider only single 
individuals and lone parents because they have a high incidence of social welfare 
participation.  
Theoretically, generous welfare policies encourage welfare utilization but 
discourage labor market participation. Favorable economic conditions coupled with 
good wages should discourage welfare utilization. Young, lone parents (age less than 35) 
are more likely to participate in welfare due to less market experience, and studies 
indicate that this group has reported declining wages1 (especially single mothers).  
The issue under investigation is if generous welfare payments have encouraged 
welfare participation in Saskatchewan and alternatively if stringent welfare payments in 
Alberta have done the opposite. In addition, which variable constraints considered in this 
study can explain the difference in welfare participation among the two provinces; 
greater emphasis will be given to welfare. 
Hence the objectives: 
• To show the trend in welfare and labor market participation in the two provinces. 
Does welfare participation in the two provinces exhibit a cyclical pattern? That is, 
participation increases in business downturns and decreases in the expansion. 
• To explain welfare participation differences between Saskatchewan and Alberta 
by decomposing the welfare differentials into the explained and the unexplained.  
• To compare this study with previous studies done in Canada. 
                                                 
1 See Dooley Martin (1997). 
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  Empirical studies support the claim that generous welfare policies encourage 
welfare participation and there are several studies done in Canada and the US that 
reaffirm this assertion. Moreover, data on welfare caseloads indicate that provinces with 
generous welfare policies have high incidences of welfare participation (Clemens and 
Schafer, 2002). However, empirical studies on the effects of welfare reforms on welfare 
participation have produced mixed results; some studies show that welfare reforms have 
reduced welfare caseloads and encouraged labor force participation (Alberta is a good 
example in Canada) while others indicate the opposite (Boessonkool, 1997).  
 
1.2 Policy Issue 
Many welfare recipients experience severe disincentives when considering labor 
market involvement. At the same time, most of the recent welfare reforms have focused 
on policies that encourage welfare recipients to join the labor market. The question is are 
these policies sustainable and to what extent can they be applied to generate the 
expected results without causing severe disincentives to labor market participation?  
 
1.3 Outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief look at the welfare 
policy in Canada, and in Saskatchewan and Alberta. Chapter 3 outlines a critical review 
of literature relevant to welfare and labor participation issues and also gives a brief 
explanation of the relationship between welfare and poverty. Chapter 4 provides a 
theoretical background for analysis of the hypothesis posed in this study and description 
of the data employed.  Chapter 5 explains the econometric model used to investigate the 
validity of the issues highlighted in chapter 4. Chapter 6 presents the results and 
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interpretation of the results; the results are also used to explain the welfare differentials 
in Saskatchewan and Alberta, the explanation of the results emphasizes more on welfare. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the paper and future research proposals.   
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Chapter 2 
Canada and the Provincial Welfare System 
This chapter provides an introduction into the welfare programs in Canada, and 
the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. It also highlights the trends in welfare 
caseloads, welfare participation rates as a percentage of population, and labor market 
participation rates among the groups considered. A relationship between the welfare 
caseloads and unemployment rates is also considered. 
 
2.1 Overview 
Canada prides itself in being able to provide its citizens with a high standard of 
living that is guaranteed through provision of social assistance and other public 
assistance programs. The welfare system or social assistance program is one of a range 
of income security programs available to the Canadian public; others include the 
Employment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, Provincial Automobile Accident 
Insurance and Old Age Security (National Council of Welfare, 1987). These programs 
are designed to provide assistance to selected segments of the Canadian population. 
Consequently, the Canadian welfare system is often referred to as the “safety 
net” because it comes into play when other sources of funds, such as personal savings 
are exhausted or when individuals or families need to supplement their income in an 
emergency or special need (National Council of Welfare, 1992). It is for this reason that
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social assistance as we know it is viewed as the income program of last resort; it 
provides financial assistance to individuals and families in need as the last alternative. 
 
2.1.1 What is Social Welfare? 
Social welfare can be defined as a network of legislation, policies, institutions, 
resources, and services that have been developed to ensure that citizens will have access 
to those materials, services and resources of society that will permit them to develop 
their potential as the individuals in a manner acceptable to them with due regard to the 
rights of others (Turner & Turner, 1981). 
Provision of welfare plays an important part of the social construct of the 
Canadian society. Although welfare provision remains the sole responsibility of the 
governments (federal and provincial), the private sector also plays a role in the provision 
of welfare. For this reason we have to distinguish between public and private social 
welfare, this distinction is made by Hick (2002). It is important to realize that distinction 
made here is not in terms of who funds the program, but rather how it is delivered. 
 
2.1.1.1 Public and Private Social Welfare 
The three levels of government (federal, provincial, and municipal) and other 
public non-governmental organizations, advisory and appeal boards are involved in the 
formulation and administration of social welfare. For example Canada Assistance Plan 
(CAP) or Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) as is known today (Hick, 2002). 
Private welfare is provided by not-for-profit or non-governmental organizations 
and commercial or for-profit firms. These firms receive funds from government or from 
private donors; they may also receive funds through private contracts to carry out some 
 7
work on behalf of the government or private organizations. Examples can be nursing 
homes or in-home care services (Hick, 2002). 
   
2.2 Brief History of the Canadian Welfare System 
Before the emergence of welfare programs for the poor, the federal government 
did not recognize that it had the responsibility towards the poor (Osborne, 1985). Caring 
for the poor was traditionally viewed as the responsibility of the church. Churches and 
other charity organizations had the ultimate responsibility of taking care of the needy; 
the sick, the old and the disabled members of the community.                  
The church and other charity organizations had the responsibility of 
administering social welfare, setting the rules, and enforcing them. For instance, they 
were supposed to ensure that individuals who could work were given the opportunity, 
and any individual who tried to defraud the system was punished accordingly (National 
Council of Welfare, 1987).  The same principle is still inherent in the welfare system 
today; employable individuals are expected to find work and only utilize welfare when 
there are no alternatives.  
At the beginning, applying for welfare was a sign of personal failure and there 
was a lot of stigma attached to it (National Council of Welfare, 1987). However, after 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, it became clear that welfare was not only for the lazy 
individuals who had failed in the society, but anybody could be vulnerable. Churches 
and local organizations could no longer support the widespread need in the society. 
Federal and provincial governments had to take responsibility.  
The welfare system or social assistance as we know it today has been evolving 
over time through several legislations introduced by the federal government. In 1939 the 
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government introduced the Unemployment Relief Assistance Act which allowed the 
government to make payments to the provinces to help them provide relief to the 
unemployed (Osborne, 1985). Between 1951 and 1954 three categorical welfare 
programs were introduced, Old Age Assistance, Blind Persons’ Allowances and 
Disabled Persons’ Allowances. The federal government offered to share at least 50 
percent of provincial expenditures on allowances for residents who fell into the 
appropriate category (aged 65 to 69, legally blind, or totally and permanently disabled) 
and had passed the means test (Osborne, 1985). The conditions under these programs 
were tight and inflexible and were intended to make sure that only “legitimate”, needy, 
and “deserving” poor people qualified. As a result, the welfare programs were plagued 
with complicated procedures and administration that they were not adequately serving 
the people they were made for (Osborne, 1985). 
In 1958 the Canadian Welfare Council called for improvements in the areas of 
income maintenance, public assistance and unemployment insurance. In the same year 
they recommended a public assistance act that would be an extension of the 
Unemployment Assistance Act and which would enable the federal government to share 
the aggregate costs with provinces (National Council of Welfare, 1987). In addition, this 
act provided the provinces the freedom to continue with the original programs or 
incorporate them into the general Public Assistance program.  The act predetermined 
that:  
a) Length of residence shall not be the condition for the receipt of assistance. 
         b)   The proportion of costs carried by the federal government shall progressively 
increase as the total number of persons on public assistance in a province increases 
beyond the predetermined percentage of the population. 
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2.2.1 The Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) 
In 1966, the Canada Assistance Plan was borne, it was an attempt to merge the 
different programs in existence and also create a comprehensive and structured income 
assistance program. The Canada Assistance Plan Act formed the legislative backbone of 
all public assistance programs both at the provincial and federal levels. Under CAP the 
federal government funds about 50% of the welfare costs while the provinces fund the 
rest. Since 1977, the federal government provided contributions to the post secondary 
education and health care services through the Established Programs Financing (EPF).  
Under CAP, provinces establish the eligibility rules for social assistance based on a 
needs test. The provinces make services available to all those eligible regardless of when 
they establish residency in the province. In addition they are also responsible for 
establishing an appeal procedure and are required not to force an individual to work or 
do any other community service in return for social welfare.  
 
2.2.2 Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) 
One of the most significant changes to welfare programs since the introduction 
of CAP was the introduction of CHST in 1996. The CHST involved the merging of CAP 
and EPF into one program. CHST is a fixed per capita payment; hence federal transfers 
are not connected to either needs of the people or the state of the economy (Hick, 2002). 
Several concerns have been raised with the introduction of CHST. For instance 
under CHST the economic stabilizing effect of the social spending has been minimized 
and many view this as a shortcoming of the CHST programs. In addition, the regulations 
associated with CAP were repelled except for the residency requirements. The CHST 
gives provinces autonomy in establishing and administering welfare programs and many 
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social analysts have expressed concern that this might remove the national standards set 
out  under CAP and create significant disparities across provinces. 
Moreover, the provincial and territorial governments expressed disapproval of 
the cancellation of CAP and replacement with CHST. In an attempt to encourage 
cooperation among the different governments, in 1999, the Social Union Agreement 
(SUA) was established. Under the Social Union Agreement the different governments 
work together and focus their efforts to renewing and modernizing Canadian social 
policy (Hick, 2002). Some of the initiatives established under the SUA are the National 
Child Benefits, the National Children’s Agenda for child care and services for persons 
with disabilities. The SUA aims to renew the Canadian system of social welfare and to 
reassure the public that the government is making every effort to ensure their social 
security.  
 
2.3 Saskatchewan and Alberta Welfare Programs 
2.3.1 Jurisdictional Matters  
 Each province is responsible for the design, administration and delivery of its 
own social assistance program. Most provinces have a unified social assistance program, 
but provinces like Nova Scotia, Ontario and Manitoba have a “two- tier” social 
assistance program (National Council of Welfare, 1991). These provinces offer social 
support based on which category the clients falls within. The municipalities are 
responsible for assistance to persons who do not fall within the provincial jurisdiction 
(National Council of Welfare, 1991). 
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2.3.2 Objectives of the Provincial Welfare Programs 
• The assurance of adequate individual or family income through the transfer of 
financial benefits. 
• The assurance of continuity of individual or family income by protection 
against unforeseen interruption of earnings. 
• The provision of incentive to work or improve an individuals opportunity for 
self- sufficiency  
• The assurance of reasonable lifetime distribution of income through transfers to 
persons whose earnings or demographic characteristics tend to place stringent 
restrictions on their disposable incomes example the young, the elderly and 
parents with dependent children (National Council of Welfare, 1990). 
 
2.3.3 Eligibility2 
Eligibility is based on a needs test whereby the individuals or households receive 
welfare payments based on a shortfall in personal or household income as measured by 
the needs test, (National council of welfare, 1995). Administrative rules vary across the 
provinces. For instance, in Alberta application for Social Assistance is a two step 
process while in Saskatchewan if applicants have a genuine need Social Assistance will 
be provided. Moreover, the applicants must be of a certain age (usually between the ages 
of 18-65). Full time students in post secondary institutions are only allowed to apply for 
social assistance under special circumstances. Single parents are supposed to seek 
                                                 
2 For additional information see the Social Assistance Handbook for the provinces of Saskatchewan and 
Alberta. 
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alimony, which they are eligible for, and disabled individuals are required to provide a 
medical certificate to their condition (National Council of Welfare, 1995). 
 
2.3.4 Rates of Assistance  
Every province and territory uses different methods for calculating basic 
assistance, which generally includes food, clothing, shelter, utilities and an allowance for 
personal and household needs. The total assistance granted to a family or an individual 
will depend on the following: place of residence; individuals living in urban areas will 
receive more benefits compared to rural areas, ages of any children, employability of the 
household head, type of housing, and case history. Applicants are also eligible for 
additional assistance if they have special needs, such as medication and prosthetic 
devices (National Council of Welfare, 1995).  
 
2.3.5 Earning Exemptions  
Applicant’s employment income is subjected to a monthly tax. That is, social 
assistance recipients are allowed to keep some of their employment income up to a 
certain maximum. After that, employment income is deducted dollar for dollar. In 
Saskatchewan for instance, single employable individuals and are allowed to keep $25 
of monthly earned income + 20% of excess (maximum exemption of $75), for a two 
person family $50 of earned income + 20% of excess (maximum exemption of $150) 
(National Council of Welfare, 1996).   
  In Alberta, everybody is subjected to the same tax rate; individuals and families 
are allowed to keep $ 115 of income and 25% of net income over $ 115. For instance if 
an individual earns $ 200 a month the individual will be allowed to keep $115 then the 
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next $85 is subject to a 75% tax rate in total they will keep $136.25. This tax rate 
imposes a very high marginal tax rate on welfare recipients which is even higher than 
full time workers. 
 
2.4 Saskatchewan Assistance Plan  
The Saskatchewan assistance plan is administered through the Department of 
Social Services and six regional offices distributed throughout the province. The 
regional offices are responsible for determining eligibility and administering health and 
financial benefits for recipients under the Saskatchewan Assistance Act and Regulations. 
Under this program the Department of Social Services provides funds to meet the costs 
of food, shelter, utilities, and clothing and supplementary health services for the 
individual and families who for various reasons had insufficient funds to meet basic 
needs (Social Assistance Handbook 1997). 
Residents in need apply for assistance through the regional offices nearest to 
them.  After the assessment of their need (needs testing), clients receive benefits as well 
as any information relating to their rights and responsibilities (Social Assistance 
Handbook, 1997). 
 
2.4.1 Eligibility 
In general, individuals and families in need would be given assistance. Eligibility 
is based on budget deficit method; all applicants are subjected to similar asset 
exemption levels, regardless of the reason for assistance (Social Assistance Handbook, 
1997). However, exemptions will vary based on the individual or family circumstances. 
For instance disabled individuals will have higher levels of exemptions compared to 
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employable individuals.  Individuals and families are required to have exhausted all the 
other options available to them for financial assistance, social assistance is viewed as 
the last resort to financial help. The applicants will receive monthly benefits based on a 
pre-added budget, which covers support and shelter requirements (Health and welfare 
Canada, 1990). The amount of support payable is as defined in section 2.3.4.  
 
2.4.2 Income   
 Monthly earnings are calculated as a flat rate amount plus a percentage of 
earnings exceeding that amount, up to a specified maximum for disabled and non-
disabled case categories by family size (Social assistance Handbook, 1997). 
Non-disabled fully employable individuals are not entitled to earnings 
exemptions for the first three months on social assistance. Saskatchewan also deducts 
the child tax benefits from welfare payments.  
All assets you had two years before you applied for assistance will be reviewed, 
and the social worker will tell you how your assets affect the amount of money you get. 
The following assets are to be reported, liquid assets such as bank accounts bonds etc, 
real assets like houses, personal assets like cars, jewellery etcetera (Social Assistance 
Handbook).  In the calculation of financial resources the applicant is allowed $ 1500 for 
one person, $ 3000 for two people and $ 500 for each additional family member (Social 
Assistance Handbook). For example, a family of 5 is allowed to keep $4500 in total 
assets. 
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2.5 Alberta Social Services and Community Health  
Alberta’s welfare policy takes a proactive approach. As a result, the Alberta 
government has been both commended and criticized for its welfare policy. Opponents 
view it as stringent and an attempt by the Alberta government to forfeit its 
responsibilities. Proponents view it as an attempt to deal with problems that plague 
many welfare programs in Canadian provinces. 
Challenged by ever increasing welfare caseloads, the Alberta government was 
determined to change the welfare culture that was not only prevalent in Alberta but also 
in Canada as whole; sky rocketing caseloads even in times of economic prosperity. 
In 1993, Alberta introduced significant changes to its welfare program. The 
objectives of these reforms were: to integrate the income support programs with 
employment related services, providing new employment and training opportunities, 
improving access to mainstream student assistance and removing the disincentives to 
work (Boessonkool, 1997). 
 
2.5.1 The Alberta Welfare Program 
Welfare in Alberta is administered by the Alberta’s Department of Family and 
Social Services (AFSS). It delivers two programs; a welfare program called Supports for 
Independence (SFI) 3  and Assured Income Security for the Severely Handicapped 
(AISH). AISH provides support for individuals with severe mental and physical 
disabilities, while SFI supports employable individuals without physical limitations to 
                                                 
3 From May 2004 Alberta Changed its SFI program to Alberta Works. Its focus is on training people for 
employment (for additional information See Human Resources and Employment Alberta, 
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/hre/albertaworks/index.asp). 
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work but facing unique circumstances that prevents them from active market 
employment. In addition, SFI is also given to dependents of individuals on AISH.  
The welfare reforms of 1993 saw Alberta achieve very dramatic declines in 
welfare caseloads. The reforms were achieved through administrative changes and 
emphasis on support towards self-reliance.  Administrative changes involved tightening 
the eligibility criteria and prevention of misuse. Second, was the shift from emphasizing 
financial assistance to providing assistance in returning to the workforce (Boessonkool, 
1997). 
After introduction of these reforms, applying for welfare became a two-step 
process especially for employable individuals. Through this, the department aims to 
discourage recidivism, ensure that the help goes to the deserving clients, and discourage 
new people from joining the welfare caseloads. In addition, the department is trying to 
discourage “learned behavior” whereby the individuals master the system and use it to 
their advantage (Boessonkool, 1997). Moreover the Department introduced random 
home visits to ensure that eligibility and appropriate level of assistance is offered. 
Welfare benefits were also reduced to coincide with those of low income working 
Albertans. 
 
2.5.2 Eligibility and Income 
If you qualify for welfare (or SFI as is referred to in Alberta), you and your 
family will be placed into one of the four categories depending on the ability to work. 
Each category has different benefits and applicants expectation. Your income, and where 
it comes from, will determine whether you qualify for SFI and how much you will 
receive. The following incomes are deducted dollar for dollar (SFI guide, 1997): 
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• Employment Insurance  
• Workers’ compensation and other sickness or accident insurance payments. 
• Canada pension plan  (CPP) benefits  
• Child or spousal support. 
The following incomes will partly be deducted from your income, employment 
income while you receive SFI, money from room and board (25% deducted) and money 
from renting part of your home (50% deducted). These incomes will not be deducted 
from social assistance payments, net employment income of each dependent child who 
is attending school, Canada child tax benefit, goods and services Tax (GST) credits, 
Alberta family employment tax credit and gifts and money less than $600 (over $600 is 
deducted dollar for dollar). 
 
2.5.3 Assets  
  Individuals applying for social assistance are required to report all their assets 
as they are used in determining how much assistance you will be given. All assets you 
had two years before you applied for assistance will be reviewed. The following assets 
are considered: 
• Liquid assets such as (bank accounts, bonds, or investment certificates) 
           You can keep a certain amount of your liquid assets at the time of application, 
$1500 for one person, $3000 for two people in your family and $500 for an additional 
family member. For example a family of two can have $3000 in liquid assets and while 
a family of six will have $ 5000 in liquid assets.  
• Real assets (such as  a house or land) 
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• Personal assets examples are a car, truck, jewellery etcetera (Government of 
Alberta, 1997) 
 
2.6 Welfare Beneficiaries in Saskatchewan and Alberta 
Generally welfare participation patterns in both provinces have followed the 
same trend over the period represented on figure 2.1. Both provinces experienced an 
increase in welfare caseloads between the periods of 1986-1992 with Saskatchewan 
showing a few fluctuations. 
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Source: Cost-shared programs division, Strategic Policy Branch, Human  
             Resource and Development Canada 
 
Beginning in 1991, Alberta started to record very high numbers of welfare 
caseloads and reached a peak in 1993. This was partly due to the economic recession of 
the early 1990s. In 1993, Alberta introduced welfare reforms which came into effect in 
1994. Since then Alberta began to experience decreasing welfare cases. 
In Saskatchewan, welfare cases followed the same pattern (as Alberta) but 
peaked in 1995. In 1998 the Saskatchewan government introduced some reforms to the 
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welfare programs. From 1998, Alberta and Saskatchewan have continued to record 
almost similar numbers in welfare cases (Figure 2.1).  Given the number of welfare 
beneficiaries in Alberta and Saskatchewan, the caseloads in Saskatchewan represent a 
bigger portion of the Saskatchewan population compared to Alberta (Table 2.1).  This 
might be a reason for increased criticisms to Saskatchewan’s welfare program. 
 
Table 2.1: Welfare Caseloads as a Percentage of the Provincial Population,  
                   Labor Force Participation Rates and Unemployment Rates 
 
YEAR % of SK POP % of AB POP LFPR4 SK LFPR AB UR 5SK UR  AB 
1986 6.1 5.2 76.8 79.0 7.4 9.0 
1987 6.0 6.2 76.7 79.4 6.9 8.2 
1988 5.9 6.1 77.5 79.8 6.4 7.0 
1989 5.6 6.1 77.4 80.1 7.1 6.7 
1990 5.4 5.8 78.2 80.0 6.8 6.4 
1991 5.3 6.0 78.7 80.3 6.8 7.9 
1992 6.0 7.1 78.2 79.9 7.6 9.2 
1993 6.8 7.3 78.5 79.7 8.1 9.4 
1994 8.0 5.1 77.9 80.3 6.5 8.1 
1995 8.1 4.1 77.9 80.5 6.6 7.2 
1996 7.9 3.8 77.3 80.6 6.5 6.1 
1997 7.8 3.2 78.3 80.5 5.5 5.1 
1998 7.1 2.6 78.6 81.1 5.3 5.0 
1999 6.5 2.4 79.0 81.0 5.9 4.7 
2000 6.2 2.2 78.7 80.7 4.4 4.1 
2001 6.1 2.0 77.8 81.0 5.3 4.1 
2002 5.6 1.7 79.4 81.8 5.0 4.6 
2003 5.3 1.8 80.4 82.1 5.3 4.5 
Source: Cost-shared Programs Division, Strategic Policy Branch, Human Resource and 
Development Canada, CANSIM II Tables 510001 and 2820002                
   
 
 
From Table 2.1, we can see that although welfare caseloads continued to increase 
(especially before the welfare reforms,) labor force participation rates have continued to 
increase in the both provinces. Alberta’s labor market participation has continued to 
                                                 
4 Labor participation rate is defined as the proportion of non-institutionalized civilian population 15 years 
and above that are in the labor force (population of 15-64). 
5 UR is the provincial unemployment rate. 
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show an upward trend as the welfare caseloads have continued to decline. Saskatchewan 
labor market participation rates show an upward trend but with a few fluctuations. 
 
2.7 Welfare and Unemployment Rate  
Welfare participation is said to increase when there is a recession and decrease 
when there is an expansion and the same can be said of unemployment rates. From 
Table 2.1 above, we can say that welfare participation has followed the same pattern. 
For instance in 1993, Alberta had the highest unemployment rate approximately 9.4% 
and that coincides with the highest percentage of welfare recipients (7.3) in the 18 year 
period represented in the table above.  
 In Saskatchewan, unemployment rates and caseloads have followed the same 
pattern. However, there are times when the percentage in caseloads is higher than the 
unemployment rates in the same year. For instance, in 1995 Saskatchewan had the 
highest percentage in caseloads but that does not coincide with a high unemployment 
rate.  
In general we can say that both provinces show the same pattern in welfare 
program participation and unemployment rates; high unemployment rates coincide with 
high percentages in welfare caseloads. Both provinces also show a downward trend in 
welfare caseloads after introducing some reforms to the welfare program. In Alberta we 
begin to see a decline in caseloads after 1993 and in Saskatchewan after 1996, the same 
can be said of the unemployment rates. This can partly be explained by the improving 
economic conditions in both provinces and welfare policies in place.  
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From Figure 2.2 and 2.3 we can see that Alberta exhibits a positive correlation 
between welfare rates and unemployment rate (r6= 0.9033) compared to Saskatchewan 
(r=-0.0012).  Alberta’s experience confirms the idea that welfare utilization increases in 
periods of business downturns (high unemployment rates) while Saskatchewan’s 
experience shows a very weak relationship. 
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Figure 2.2(b) 
                                                 
6 r indicates the correlation coefficient. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review of studies as pertains to welfare and labor market 
participation issues. A review of Canadian literature is provided first followed by the 
American literature. The chapter also provides a brief discussion on the interaction 
between Employment Insurance and Social Assistance, and the relationship between 
welfare and poverty. 
 
 3.1 Overview 
Labor supply behavior of low-income individuals and welfare recipients 
continues to be a key research area in economics; many studies have been undertaken 
both empirically and theoretically. One of the important issues discussed has been the 
effect of welfare programs on labor market participation. In the US especially, there has 
been a keen interest on the interaction of welfare program utilization and labor market 
participation among single mothers who are said to comprise a large portion of welfare 
recipients. In Canada, on the other hand, research on this issue has been very limited and 
only begun to gain popularity after the 1990s welfare reforms.  
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3.2 Canadian Studies  
Christofides et al (1997) applied a bivariate probit model of welfare and labor 
force participation to account for the correlation among the two decisions. They justify 
the use of bivariate probit model because they argue that the decision to go on welfare or 
labor market or both depends on the individual’s or family’s income, since an individual 
with sufficient income will not qualify for welfare. They utilized data from the Canadian 
Labor Market Activity Surveys 1998-9 (LMAS), which are longitudinal surveys carried 
out yearly. The data set provides detailed information on the individual’s market activity 
and income received in a given year. They find that welfare and labor market 
participation decisions are not independent as evidenced by the significant correlation 
coefficient they found in their study.  In addition, they find that the generosity of welfare 
programs (as measured by the basic allowance) does not influence participation 
decisions as suggested by the static labor supply model. However, they argue that tax on 
earned income; personal characteristics and available market opportunities have a 
significant role in welfare and labor market participation decisions. They conclude that 
policies directed exclusively to the generosity of welfare program will reduce program 
costs but may fail to reduce the welfare rolls or encourage labor market activity. 
In another study, Kapsalis (1996) explores the incidence of social assistance and 
employment rate of lone mothers in Ontario and Quebec. He utilized data from the 1989 
LMAS on the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.  He found that, higher social assistance 
benefits had a negative effect on employment rate of lone mothers in Ontario but the 
labor market conditions did not have a major impact on employment rates. Kapsalis 
concluded that efforts to improve the income situation of lone mothers should be 
combined with work incentives to avoid dependency. 
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  Fortin et al (1993), using a data set from the 1986 Consumer Finances Survey 
(CFS) for Quebec, analyze the effects of welfare programs by simulating the effects of 
different combinations of basic allowance (G) and marginal taxes (t) on different social 
welfare indices. Their results do support other works on Negative Income Tax (NIT) but 
they also indicate that their results suggest otherwise. They suggest that a workfare 
scheme properly categorized to take into account heterogeneity of population could be 
Pareto superior to NITs. In addition, they emphasize that NIT and workfare programs 
should be regarded as complimentary rather than substitute programs. 
Charette and Meng (1994) estimate the probability of welfare participation by 
female-headed households given changes in benefit level, earned income and the 
implicit tax. Data used in this study is taken from the 1989 LMAS and welfare incomes 
published by the National Council of Welfare. They find that marital status and family 
structure are important determinants of welfare participation. Children increase the 
probability of welfare participation; presence of children under the age of 6 increases the 
probability of welfare participation by 0.33 while older ones by 0.09. However, labor 
market conditions as measured by the unemployment rate do not seem to have a 
significant effect on welfare participation among female-headed households. Expected 
wages have a significant negative effect on welfare participation while basic welfare 
benefit levels have a significant positive impact on welfare participation. They report the 
elasticity of welfare participation with respect to wage rate to be -0.38 and that of basic 
assistance level to be 0.27.  
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3.2.1 Dynamics of Welfare Participation 
Following the increased emphasis by the provincial governments on welfare 
reform, several researchers have focused their interest on understanding the behavior of 
welfare recipients. The idea stems from the fact that to initiate meaningful reforms you 
have to understand the behavior of the people you are trying to affect with your policies, 
consequently the study of dynamics of welfare. Studies on dynamics of welfare focus on 
determining welfare spells among different social demographic groups. The spells are 
used to characterize the durations of exit and entry rates and thus identify high-risk 
groups.  
Most of the research carried out in Canada has been at provincial levels; so far 
these studies have been carried out in British Columbia (Barrett, 1996; Barrett and 
Cragg, 1998), Quebec (Fortin, Lacroix, and Roberger1996; Fortin, Lacroix and Thibault, 
1998) and Ontario (Stewart and Dooley, 1997), and Newfoundland (Lacroix, 1999). 
Results from these studies indicate that on average most of the welfare spells last 
an average of one year and exit rates becoming rare with increase in the length of the 
spells. Single men and individuals with higher education are more likely to exit welfare 
faster compared to single women and less educated individuals. Lone parents exhibit the 
lowest exit rates and couples with or without children have the same exit rates (Barret 
and Cragg, 1998).  
 
3.3 United States 
In the US, the following programs have received a lot of attention: Aid for 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamps and Medicaid. Analysis of these programs 
has focused on single mothers although other family structures have been considered. A 
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study by Hagstrom (1995) on married couples, to determine the effect of Food Stamp 
program on interfamily labor supply and program participation decisions found that 
married couples’ program participation is relatively responsive to changes in food stamp 
benefits. Moreover, the own wage elasticities indicate that wives are on average more 
responsive to changes in wages than husbands. He used Data from the Survey of Income 
and Program participation using a nested multinomial logit model.  
In another study by Gensler and Walls (1997), they apply a bivariate probit 
model to determine the effects of welfare program on labor supply decisions of low 
income families. They use data from US Census Bureau of Current Population Survey. 
They find that effective welfare guarantee levels and the effective tax rates on unearned 
income significantly affect the probability of labor market and welfare participation but 
the estimated impact is very small in magnitude. They report that a $1000 increase in 
welfare guarantee levels would increase the probability of welfare receipt by 0.05 but 
reduce the probability of labor market participation by 0.02. From their results they 
concluded that welfare policy instruments have a very small impact in practical terms. In 
addition they also indicate that their data supports the use of a bivariate probit model. 
Gensler (1996) studied the effect of welfare program characteristics on the 
decision to seek welfare. He compares one and two-parent families using data from US 
census Bureau’s of Current Population Survey. The decision to seek welfare is modeled 
as a binary choice dependent upon an underlying index function. He finds the decision to 
enter the welfare system is affected by the alternative opportunities as represented by the 
available or expected wage and the unemployment rate. 
Kilkenny and Huffman (2002) using a bivariate probit model and data from US 
Census Bureau to study the interaction of regional welfare programs and labor force 
 27
participation, find that estimated wages have a larger effect on both labor force and 
welfare participation than the welfare policy instruments. They also indicate that many 
eligible households do not participate in welfare programs because the costs of 
participating outweigh the benefits. 
Moffitt and Keane (1998) estimate a structural model of multiple welfare 
program participation and labor supply using data form the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) in the US. They apply a multinomial choice model; this 
involves the estimation of the labor supply model jointly with three welfare participation 
equations in order to account for the correlations between the error terms. They find that 
participation in one of the major transfer programs for the poor in the US like subsidized 
housing is unrelated to housing benefits. 
Moreover, they also find that while cumulative tax rates for recipients in multiple 
programs are very high, small to moderate reduction on those tax rates have very little 
effect on labor supply. This is because decreases in labor supply are offset by increased 
program entry. Using their estimates they compute the uncompensated wage elasticity at 
variable means. They report the wage elasticity of 1.94 and -0.21 for total income.  
 
3.4 Employment Insurance and Social Assistance  
Employment Insurance (EI) and Social Assistance (SA) are the two principal 
public assistance programs available to the non-elderly population in Canada. There has 
been a growing research interest in Canada on the interaction of the two programs. For 
instance, Grey (2002) studied the interaction of Employment Insurance (EI) and Social 
Assistance (SA) in Canada from 1987 to 1997. Using data on Survey of Consumer 
Finances and EI coverage survey for 1999, find that few individuals combine EI and SA 
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in the same year. He goes on to discuss that the EI is concentrated among the 
unemployed with recent employment and SA was concentrated among long-term jobless. 
He concludes that this points out the difficulty of mixing short-term employment and SA. 
 
3.5 Welfare and Poverty  
This study is not intended to discuss welfare and poverty issues. However, it is 
important to make the connection because the National Council of Welfare has reported 
that the incidence of poverty among welfare recipients is very high.  
The National Council of Welfare publishes a yearly report on the plight of 
welfare recipients in Canada. They have argued that the current welfare payments are 
inadequate and exacerbate the poverty problem especially among single parent families. 
Single parent families are especially vulnerable; since many are employed in low paying 
jobs, part- time work or rely on welfare for support. In addition welfare recipients are 
faced with that constant reminder that their income situation can change any time.  
The National Council of Welfare and many other social groups regard Low 
Income Cut-offs (LICOS) produced by Statistics Canada as poverty lines. Using this 
measure they have shown that welfare incomes have continued to decline and represent 
20% to 80% of poverty lines in Canada (National Council of Welfare, 1996). These 
poverty lines have been the basis for arguing that poverty is prevalent among welfare 
recipients. 
However, Chris Sarlo 1996, in his book Poverty in Canada, has argued that 
LICOs are not a good measure of poverty because they are relative measures and 
therefore will increase with increase in average incomes. Instead he suggests the use of 
Basic Needs Lines (BNLs) which are constructed to measure what it costs to buy the 
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basic necessities in Canada. Using the same measure (BNLs), Emes and Kreptul (1999) 
have shown that welfare incomes are enough to cover the costs of basic necessities and 
in cases where they are below the BNL the differences are quite small. Furthermore they 
have argued that by using LICOs it becomes nearly impossible to eliminate poverty, and 
no matter how well off Canadians are there will always be people below the poverty 
lines 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework and Data 
This chapter presents the basic labor supply theory based on an individual’s 
optimization problem subject to constraints. It also examines labor supply and welfare 
participation decision given the welfare programs in place. A description and the sources 
of the data are also given.   
 
4.1 Overview 
Analyzing the effect of welfare programs on welfare and labor force participation 
can be a complicated issue; first, changes to welfare program parameters may either 
change the eligibility point or make individuals to locate above or below the eligibility 
point (Moffitt, 2002). Secondly, welfare participation itself is a choice variable, not only 
because of the decision to locate above or below the eligibility point but also some 
individuals whose income is below the eligibility point choose not to participate in 
welfare. The above reasons and others such as differences in welfare program 
administration across the provinces, human capital investment and job search behavior 
further complicate the analysis. 
Fortunately, the labor supply model of income-leisure choice provides the 
framework for organizing the possible effects of welfare program parameters on welfare 
and labor force participation.  
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4.2 The Basic Income- Leisure Choice Model 
In the neo-classical model of labor supply, an individual is assumed to maximize 
utility subject to certain constraints. Individuals are assumed rational and therefore will 
make choices that increase their utility; the utility function is maximized by choice of 
hours of work, and therefore labor income earned and leisure time. An individual 
accepts social assistance if the value of the indirect utility function from participation in 
the welfare program exceeds that from non-participation. 
An individual is assumed to have a well behaved preference function defined 
over two goods; composite consumption goods and services (C) measured in terms of 
money income (I), and over hours of leisure (L), L is defined as all other activities other 
than paid market work. 
The utility function can be represented as,  
       U (L, C) where UL > 0, UC > 0  
     The budget constraint faced by an individual can be represented as  
        C= N+ W H =Y,  
Where:         
        N is the unearned income, 
       W is the wage rate  
       Y is the total Income   
       H is time devoted to market work 
Time constraint T= H + L, substituting time constraint into the budget constraint we 
have  
C = N + W (T- L)   
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Individual’s preferences can be represented graphically by non-intersecting 
downward sloping indifference curves (Figure 4.1). The slope of the indifference curve 
defined as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is the rate at which an individual 
would substitute market work for leisure. The MRS at which L=T is defined as the 
reservation wage (WR), which is the minimum acceptable wage for labor market 
participation. Figure 4.1a below gives a graphical representation of the labor-leisure 
choice model given that the individual is a non-labor market participant. 
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  Figure 4.1 (a) Budget constraint for a non- participant. 
 
   
The highest possible utility that can be attained by this individual (represented in 
figure 4.1a) is to locate at point A, equilibrium E1, where the individual supplies zero 
hours to the market. This is referred to as a corner solution because the equilibrium 
occurs at the extreme point on the budget constraint.  
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Figure 4.1 (b) Budget constraint for a labor market participant. 
 
Figure 4.1b shows an individual who will be a participant, given the individual’s 
preferences and constraints. In this case we have an interior solution (equilibrium E2) 
because the optimum occurs between the extreme points on the budget constraint. The 
interior solution equilibrium is characterized by the tangency between the budget 
constraint and the highest attainable indifference curve.  
To explain the individual’s optimum we examine the relationship between the 
MRS and the market wage rate. When the MRS at zero hours of work (slope of 
indifference curve at A) exceeds wage rate (slope of budget constraint), equilibrium E1 
in Figure 4.1(a) the individual values non-market work more than market work therefore 
the individual will be a non-labor market participant. When the MRS at zero hours of 
work is less than the wage rate, equilibrium E2 in Figure 4.1(b), the individual values 
market work more than leisure time and therefore will participate in the labor market. 
 34
The individual will increase market work until MRS between income and leisure equals 
the wage rate. 
Slope of the indifference curve at zero hours of work represents the reservation 
wage; the wage rate at which the individual will be indifferent between participating and 
not participating in the labor market, the budget constraint is given by line B and B′ 
Figure 4.1 (a) and (b). That is the point at which the individual will be indifferent 
between labor market work and non-labor market activities such as retirement, welfare 
program participation or other leisure activities. If the market wage rate is less than the 
reservation wage Figure 4.1 (a), the individual will not participate in the labor and 
instead might opt for the welfare program. Contrary, if the market wage rate is greater 
than the reservation wage Figure 4.1(b), the individual will be a labor market participant. 
 
4.2.1 Welfare Program 
A standard welfare program provides benefits B = G-t (WH + N) where G is the 
guarantee amount or basic allowance given to those with zero income and t is the 
marginal tax rate and the budget constraint is given by N+ W (T- L) =Y. When we 
combine the benefits and the budget constraint to give us the total income7, we have: 
 W (1-t) H + G – tN= Y. This formula indicates that benefits decline as the hours of 
work and non-labor income N increases, taxes reduce the income from market work and 
non –labor income (Moffitt, 2002).  
A shift in the budget line (Figure 4.2) can be caused by an increase in basic 
allowance (segment BCD), an increase in exempt earning or a decrease in program taxes 
(segment CD). Optimal choice for individuals located on segment BCD will be to be on 
                                                 
7 For additional information See Moffitt (2002) 
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welfare and at the same time labor market participants, and at point B optimal choice 
will be to supply zero hours of market work and be welfare participants.  
 
4.3 Labor Supply and Welfare Programs 
The Labor supply model discussed above provides the tools necessary to analyze 
the interaction between welfare and labor market participation. Christofides et al (1997) 
provide a graphical representation of the augmented labor leisure choice model of 
welfare. They incorporate the essential features of Canada’s provincial welfare programs, 
namely the basic allowance, the earnings exemptions and the tax on earned income in 
excess of exempt earnings; Figure 4.2 below will be used to explain the features.  
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Figure 4.2 Income- leisure choice model augmented with the welfare program 
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Excluding the welfare program, the budget constraint is given by HADI, where 
segment HA is non-labor income and segment ADI describes the trade-off between 
earned income and leisure given the market wage. The welfare budget constraints is 
HBCDI, where segment AB is the basic allowance at zero hours of work, segment BC 
captures the non-taxed earnings component, segment CD captures the taxed income, that 
is the part of earned income that would be lost when an individual supplies positive 
hours of market work. An individual’s optimum choice when located on segment DI 
above the breakeven point D is to supply positive hours of market work and not 
participate in the welfare program. 
Individuals on segment BCD will be program participants and will also supply 
positive hours of work. On the other hand, individuals at B will be program participants 
and supply zero hours of market work. In addition, there are those individuals who 
would locate on segment AD, although they are qualified to be welfare program 
participants they choose not to; this may be due the stigma associated with program 
participation, or transaction cost, or lack of information on eligibility (Moffitt, 2002).   
 
 4.3.1 Increase in Basic Assistance or Guarantee  
An increase in basic assistance will shift the ABC segment upward (parallel) to 
BEF and the breakeven point from D to G (Figure 4.3). Individuals initially located by 
their preferences on segment DG and some individuals on segment GI may now obtain 
greater utility on social assistance (Christofides et al, 1997); this will lead to an increase 
in welfare participation rate and a decline in labor market participation rate. In addition, 
other individuals who are eligible for welfare but are non- participants (segment DI ) 
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might find the benefits of participating outweigh costs of not participating and might 
now become welfare participants (Moffitt, 1992). 
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Figure 4.3 Increase in basic welfare benefits 
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Assuming that leisure is a normal good, an increase in basic allowance (AB to 
BE) will likely encourage the individuals located at this point to continue supplying zero 
hours of work. Moreover, some individuals due to the increase in welfare benefits will 
locate at point E ‘corner solution’. The optimal solution would be to supply zero hours 
of market work and become welfare program participants. Assuming that the effect is 
big enough, the result will be an increase in welfare participation rates and decline in 
labor market participation rates. 
 
Therefore, given an individual’s preferences and budget constraints, increase in basic 
assistance or guarantee amount will likely increase welfare participation rates and 
decrease labor market participation rates. 
 
 4.3.2 A Decrease in Program Tax  
  A decrease in program tax rate (segment CE) (Figure 4.4) would shift the break 
even point from D to E, therefore making individuals who were both welfare and labor 
market participants to either increase or decrease  the supply of market hours. On the 
other hand, the non-welfare participants would find higher benefits to welfare 
participation and might reduce their hours of work. 
Income
I F 
E 
C 
D 
B 
A
O H 
Hours of work 
Leisure
 
Figure 4.4 Welfare program with a decrease in program tax 
 
Blank (2002) asserts that a change in marginal tax rate is equivalent to a change 
in the effective wage rate, because it includes both income and substitution effects, it is 
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theoretically uncertain whether work incentives should rise or fall. At low wages 
substitution effects should dominate income effects of low-income workers, which 
suggest that lower marginal rates should increase work incentives. A decrease in 
marginal taxes would not have an effect on the decision to participate in the labor market. 
 
4.3.2.1 Change in Exempt Earnings 
An increase in exempt earnings will be characterized by a parallel shift of 
segment CD to segment EF (Figure 4.4). Individual on segment ED who were initially 
non-participants are now eligible for welfare this might encourage them to reduce 
market work and participate in welfare. Individuals on segment CB might increase or 
decrease supply of market work depending on whether the substitution effect is stronger 
or the income effect.  
Generally, from the above explanation an increase in guarantee amount coupled 
with an increase in taxes will lead to an increase in welfare participation rates. 
Conversely, a decrease in guarantee amount coupled with an increase in exempt earnings 
will increase labor market participation rates.  
 
4.3.3 Basic Assistance, Program Tax Rate and Hours of Work 
Although in this study we have not considered hours of work, I think it is very 
important to mention something about hours of work because most of the effort in 
welfare reform has focused on encouraging welfare participants to engage in market 
work. An increase in basic assistance can be described as pure income effect (Figure 4.3) 
and it is expected to reduce hours of work by welfare participants.   
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A decrease in tax rate CD to CE (Figure 4.4) will have mixed substitution effect 
which implies more hours of work, if initially on CD or fewer hours if initially on ED 
but the sign cannot be assigned apriori (Christofides et al, 1997). Moreover, Moffitt 
(2002) cautions that employment hours may also be correlated with the level of tax (t) 
even if there is no labor supply response. 
 
4.4 Explanatory Variables 
The basic argument is that welfare utilization and labor market participation will 
differ depending on the shape of the indifference map or preferences. The following 
factors have been included to account for differences in preferences and budget 
constraints: 
 
4.4.1 Social Assistance Factors  
 The provincial social assistance programs differ in so many ways: in terms of 
generosity, work incentives (tax back rates, treatment of work- related costs, differential 
treatment of long term and short term recipients and administration).  In this study we 
use the basic assistance levels as reported by the National Council of Welfare8, tax back 
rates or marginal taxes are also reported by the Council and the provincial welfare 
departments. The implicit tax on unearned income is 100% because it is assumed that 
once an individual’s assets exceed a certain level then they will not be eligible for 
welfare. It is expected that generous welfare payments (basic assistance levels) will 
                                                 
8 Other researchers have used this because they have argued that the National Council of Welfare provides 
a better comparison among the provinces. 
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increase welfare participation and high marginal tax rates would discourage labor market 
participation because a big portion of the income will be taxed away. 
 
4.4.2 Demographic Factors 
The age of the individuals will determine to what extent they will utilize welfare. 
For instance young single mothers are more likely to be on welfare and participate less 
in the labor market compared to older women who might have access to child support 
and at the same time are likely to be labor market participants. The other factor is the 
children, presence of very young children is likely to increase the probability of welfare 
utilization, and aging of children will likely increase the probability of labor market 
participation and reduce welfare utilization. More education will also increase the 
probability that the individual will be a labor market participant. In this study four levels 
of education have been considered: elementary and less than high school (base group), 
high school, and diploma and university education. In this study sex is a dummy variable; 
females are the base group in both lone parents and unattached individuals. Lone parents 
especially single mothers are more likely to be welfare participants compared to single 
individuals.  
  
4.4.3 Labor Market Factors 
As the labor market conditions improve or favorable labor market conditions will 
tend to encourage more people to be labor market participants. In this study the 
provincial unemployment rate is used to capture the economic conditions in the province. 
Data on the provincial unemployment rate is from Statistics Canada; and the 
unemployment rate of individuals in the prime age (25-44) both sexes is used because it 
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provides a better representation of the economic situation in the province. Wages have a 
negative influence on welfare participation; it is expected that higher wages combined 
with good economic conditions will encourage labor market participation and 
discourage welfare participation. In this study we use predicted wages because some 
individuals do not report market income; to get the predicted wage we use the Tobit 
model and the Mincer earnings equation, the procedure is explained in section (4.5.1) 
below. 
 
4.4.4 Other Economic Factors  
4.4.4.1 Non-Labor Income 
Non- labor incomes in this study includes payments for child support, inheritance 
and any other income received from other sources other than labor market. Non-labor 
income has a negative effect on welfare participation and labor market participation. 
Effective tax on non- labor income or unearned income is expected to reduce labor force 
participation rates among welfare recipients.  
 
4.4.4.2 Employment Insurance 
According to the provincial social assistance regulations, social assistance 
payments will be reduced by the amount of the employment insurance. Therefore, many 
people do not combine social assistance with employment insurance; in this study 
individuals who report some labor market activity are the most likely to report 
employment insurance. 
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4.4.5 Others 
4.4.5.1 Residence  
Residence indicates if an individual resides in the rural or urban area, people who 
live in the rural area are used as a base group. Living in an urban area increases the 
probability of labor market participation because many urban areas have increased job 
opportunities compared to rural areas.  
 
4.4.5.2 Immigration Status  
Social assistance is only given to permanent residents or Canadian citizens. It is 
expected that Canadian citizens will be more likely to utilize welfare compared to recent 
immigrants. Recent immigrants who are eligible for welfare lack proper information on 
welfare programs. In this study recent immigrants are used as the base group. 
 
4.5 Data Source 
The data used in this study is from the Survey of Consumer Finances (the survey 
is not longitudinal) available through the Internet Data Library from the University of 
Western Ontario. The survey covers the periods from 1987-1998, the information 
available on these files concerns the period 1986 -1997.  The survey is cross-sectional 
and includes both program participants and non-participants 15 years and older. In this 
study, of the individuals between the ages of 18-65, only lone parents and singles are 
considered. The data set provides information on income, the sources of the incomes and 
the individual family characteristics. The individual family characteristics are used to 
define if the individual is a lone parent or an unattached individual (single). 
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 Full time students and disabled individuals are excluded from the sample; this resulted 
in sample of about 2,717 and 3,689 of lone parents, and 4,996 and 5,000 unattached 
individuals in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. The average income reported by 
lone parents and singles on welfare is about 350 and 400 dollars per month respectively 
in this data set.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Saskatchewan Alberta 
 Lone Parents Singles Lone Parents Singles 
Percentage on 
Welfare 
27% 
9%  Males 
9% 20% 
8% Males 
8% 
Average age 33 38 34 37 
Average years of 
Schooling 
11 12 11 13 
Average income per 
Month 
$ 2,302 $1,752 $3,132 $1,842 
Average number of 
Children 
2 - 2 - 
Labor market 
experience in years 
18 20 18 22 
Average number of 
weeks on the market 
in a year 
25 33 27 35 
 
The 11 years of cross-sectional annual data are pooled and nominal dollars are 
expressed in terms of 1992 dollars9. Basic assistance levels for individuals with more 
than two children are calculated according to the assistance levels as determined by the 
provincial welfare department; in this study the highest number of children was three10. 
Table (4.2) below will give an example of how welfare incomes (guarantee amounts) in 
                                                 
9 A table of welfare incomes for the 11 years is provided in the appendix, the table provides incomes for 
single parents with one child. 
10 The values calculated are approximations and they represent the maximum or minimum assistance 
given to an individual or a family with given characteristics. 
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single parent’s households with more than one child are calculated, the basic assistance 
amounts are in $000s per year; also an example of how the marginal tax rates are 
calculated. The actual basic assistance payments will vary depending on the individual’s 
or household’s needs test.  
 
Table 4.2:  Basic Assistance Level for a Single Parent Household with Two  
                   Children (1994) 
 
            Saskatchewan  Alberta 
Single Parent with one child11 10,381 9,192 
One more child per month12 285 279 
Total for the child 285*12= 3,420 279*12=3,348 
Total assistance 13,801 12,540 
 
4.5.1 Calculating Marginal Tax Rates  
Note: the marginal tax rates are the percentage of income lost above the exemption 
level; rates are given in the Social Assistance Handbooks of respective provinces  
For example: Marginal taxes for a single person in Saskatchewan 
Employment Income per month = $ 150 
Allowed to keep up to $ 75 dollars of your income 
The next $ 75 subject to 80% tax = $ 60 
Total income to keep = $ 75 + 15= $90  
Marginal tax rate for a single person on welfare in Saskatchewan will be 
                                                 
11 The income for a single parent with one Child is given by the National Council of Welfare 
12 The amount is from the Saskatchewan Social assistance Handbook; we assume the household was on 
social assistance for the whole year. 
 
     = 80.0100
75
60 =×  or 80% 
Alberta: Marginal tax for a single individual  
Employment income per month = $150 
Allowed to keep $ 115 
Next $ 35 subject to 75% tax = $ 26.25 
Total employment income to keep = 115 +8.75 = $123.75 
Marginal tax rate for a single individual on welfare living in Alberta 
 =  75.0100
35
25.26 =×  or 75%  
Saskatchewan          Alberta 
Income       Income
0.80W 0.75W 
W
  II 
W 
I1+ W   I2+W
G G I2 I1 
Leisure Leisure
  30 days  30 days     O    O 
       I2 = 12,540 = G   I1 = 13,801 = G                   12 
            12  
W= $ 115 W= $ 150 
 
Figure 4.5 Total Monthly income for a Welfare Recipient in Saskatchewan and 
Alberta  
 
 
 
 
 
 47
4.5.2 Predicted Wages  
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) gives information on the annual labor 
income, the total number of working weeks and the total number of hours worked in a 
week, but the data does not give direct wage rates and therefore have to be calculated. 
Wage rates are calculated by dividing total earnings by the number of weeks worked in a 
year then divided by the number of hours in a week (40 hours). Unfortunately this can 
not give wages for everybody especially those who do not report positive hours of work 
and therefore we use Mincer equation to determine the predicted wage.  
The predicted wage ( ) is an increasing function of the experience (Exp) 
and level of education (Educ). Wages will increase with education and experience but 
peak at certain level of experience and begin to decline. The wage equation is estimated 
using the Tobit model of market participants and non-participants. The variable X 
includes other variables such as: sex, living in an urban area, number of children. 
geaLnw ˆ
                                        (4.1) wXExpExpEducgeaLnw εβββββ +++++= 323210ˆ
 
  4.6 Data Issues or Problems  
The data in this study does not differentiate between aboriginal and non- 
aboriginal and this can be an issue especially if the welfare differentials in Saskatchewan 
and Alberta are partly due to a high concentration of Aboriginals in either of the 
provinces. The data does not indicate how long the individual has spent on welfare. 
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 Welfare income is known to be underreported on SCF and therefore the 
participation rates are likely to be biased downwards13. The extent of that bias is not 
easy to determine because detailed national welfare caseload data are not collected and 
published in Canada on a regular basis (Dooley, 1994).This problem can be resolved by 
using administrative data but that is very difficult to find because of the privacy issues 
involved and moreover, this data has only the recipients. However, Dooley (1997), and 
Kapsalis (1996) have used Canadian data and propose that this data set will still work 
better at revealing the underlying differences and for estimation purposes.  
   
 
                                                 
13 Dooley estimates that the true participation rates are about 10-15% (not percentage points) higher, but 
he says the underreporting is fairly stable over the years. Given the stable measurement error, the SCF 
data can measure accurately the difference over time and across family types in the incidence of social 
assistance income.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Econometric Procedure and Model Specification 
 
This chapter specifies the econometric model used to identify the factors that 
determine the decision to participate in welfare and labor market. The econometric 
question to assess the issues raised in chapters 3 and 4 is also presented here. Two 
models are specified and estimated using LIMDEP an econometric software developed 
by Greene.  Only the model that provides the best fit will be used in presentation and 
discussion of the results. 
 
5.1 Hypothesis   
 
Economic research has focused on the effects of higher benefits and higher tax 
rates on welfare and labor market participation. The argument is based on the fact that 
raising the basic assistance level (G) provides a stronger safety net and encourages more 
participation in the welfare program but discourages market work. In this paper we want 
to test the validity of this proposition and how higher benefit levels have contributed to 
an increase in welfare participation rates and reduced labor market participation rates.  
The issue is to what extent the economic variables identified in chapter 4 explain 
the gap in welfare participation between Alberta and Saskatchewan. That is, how much 
of the gap can be explained by the differences in benefit rates, program tax rates, and 
economic conditions or individual characteristics.   
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5.2 Econometric Specification 
The decision to participate in welfare and labor market is modeled empirically in 
the form of a binary probit and joint bivariate model. The binary probit model takes the 
decision to participate in the labor market or the welfare program as independent and the 
bivariate probit considers the decisions as joint. The bivariate probit model was 
considered because several researchers have indicated that the two decisions might be 
dependent especially for low income individuals or families contemplating whether to be 
labor market participants or welfare program participants. They allude to its (bivariate) 
advantages over the binary probit model. One of the advantages given is that the 
bivariate model gives efficient estimates; it also captures the interrelations of the two 
decisions, allowing for a specific estimate of the degree of this relationship (Christofides 
et al, 1997); Kilkenny and Huffman, 2002). In this section both specifications are 
discussed.   
 
5.2.1 Estimation Procedure 
Since the dependent variables for individual level data takes the values of either 
1 or 0 a probit estimation technique has been used for estimation purposes. Separate 
regressions for singles and lone parents are estimated. The bivariate is estimated because 
of the reasons mentioned above. These groups (lone parents and singles) were selected 
because of a high prevalence of welfare participation.  In 1993, the government of 
Alberta introduced major changes to their welfare program. Since any change in welfare 
in welfare eligibility is likely to result in fixed time effect, a year dummy is included to 
control for that structural change in Alberta’s welfare program.  
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Based on the discussion/ theory presented in Chapter 4 the probability of 
participating in the welfare program is specified as follows: 
 
  
     PW = (βF 0+ β1G + β2 TAX + β3 AGE18+ β4AGE35+ β5AGE45 
                           (+)           (+)             (-)                 (-)             (+) 
 
                       + β6CHILD07+β7CHILD717+ β8SEX+ β9HISCH +Β10DIPL 
                                  (+)                (-)                (+)             (+)             (-) 
 
                       + β11UNIV+ β12EXPER +β13EXPERSQ+ β14  geaLnw ˆ
                                  (-)             (-)                 (-)                       (-) 
 
                       + β15OTHINC +β16E.I +β17UNRATE + β18RESIDENCE 
                                  (-)                (-)              (+)                   (+)                
                      
                      + β19IMMIG + Year + Uw)                                                 (5.1)                                            
                                 (+)               
                                      
     
  Where:  PW = Probability of welfare participation 
               G = Basic assistance or Guarantee amount in Dollars 
              TAX= Marginal tax rate, the percentage of income lost above the exemption                        
AGE18 = 1 if Ages 18 to 24 or 0 otherwise 
             AGE35 = 1 if Ages 35 to 44 or 0 otherwise 
             AGE45 = 1 if Ages 45 to 64 or 0 otherwise 
             CHILD07 = Children under age 7 
             CHILD717= Children between the ages of 7 and 17 
              SEX =   1 if male 0 if female 
              HISCH = 1 if High school education or 0 otherwise  
              DIPL = 1 if Diploma or trades certificate or 0 otherwise 
              UNIV = University education or 0 otherwise 
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           EXPER= Labor market experience in years  
            EXPERSQ= Square of experience 
             = Natural logarithm of predicted wage geaLnw ˆ
            OTHINC= Non labor income, money from child support payments and other in    
dollars 
            E.I =   Employment insurance in dollars 
            UNRATE = Provincial unemployment rate in percentages 
            RESIDENCE = Place of residence 1 if urban 0 if rural 
            IMMIG = 1 = Canadian born, 0 = Recent immigrant   
            YEAR = Dummy for structural changes in welfare program in Alberta, Before 
1993 =1                             
                                         
 Similarly the probability of labor market participation is specified as follows:   
            
          
    PLM= (βF 0+ β1G + β2 TAX + β3 AGE18+ β4AGE35+ β5AGE45 
                                     (-)           (-)             (+)                 (+)             (-) 
 
                                + β6CHILD07+β7CHILD717+ β8SEX+ β9HISCH +Β10DIPL 
                                            (-)                (+)                   (+)           (+)             (+) 
 
                                + β11UNIV+ β12EXPER +β13EXPERSQ+ β14  geaLnw ˆ
                                          (+)             (+)                 (-)                       (+) 
 
                                + β15OTHINC +β16E.I +β17UNRATE + β18RESIDENCE 
                                            (-)                (+)              (-)                   (+)                
 
                                + β19IMMIG + Year + Uw)                                              (5.2)                                      
                                           (+) 
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  Where PLM = Probability of labor market participation, the other variables are as 
defined above.  
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are estimated using LIMDEP which provides the 
marginal effects. All the data in the sample is considered therefore selectivity problems 
should not arise.  
 
5.3 Probit Model 
The value of the dependent variable in this model is either 1 for a participant and 
0 for a non-participant. Due to the nature of the data, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
does not give efficient estimates therefore; a binary choice model has to be used. An 
alternative would be the Linear Probability Model (LPM) like the OLS the LPM model 
has its challenges, such as the non- normality of error terms (ui) and the 
heteroscedasticity of ui. These models also assume that marginal effect of X remains 
constant throughout, this is not true. A binary choice model like the Probit and the Logit 
has advantage over the OLS and the LPM because it allows us to restrict the predicted 
probabilities within 1 and 0, it also allows us to take into consideration the 
heteroscedatic nature of the error terms and the normality assumption.  
The decision to participate in welfare or labor market or not is modeled as Y= 1 
if the individual is a participant or Y= 0 for non -participant. Therefore the predicted 
probability from a binary choice model is given by  14  
                                                 
14The probability that Yi* is less than or equal to Yi can be computed from the standard normal CDF as 
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           βββ )()1(Pr XFiXYiob ′=′=                                                        (5.7) 
 
Where Y is the choice variable, X is a vector of explanatory variables β  is the vector of 
parameter estimates and F  is an assumed cumulative distribution function (CDF), and 
assuming F is the standard normal distribution (Φ) produces the probit model. From 
(Greene, 2003), for a given independent vector, it is expected that;  
 
 Lim           Prob [Y=1 │X] = 1 (as X′ β approaches positive infinity the probability of y  
X′ β→+ ∞                                       given X will equal 1) 
 
 
 Lim           Prob [Y=1 │X] = 0 (as X′ β approaches negative infinity the probability of y  
X′ β→- ∞                                       given X will equal 0) 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Marginal Effects 
The probit model is computed from the standardized normal cumulative 
distribution function CDF, because the βs do not give the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables, the marginal effects have to be determined and they will be given 
by: 
 
             [ ] ( ) [ ]1Pr 1111 ==′Φ= YobXXYE β  
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∂
                             (5.8)           
                   
                                                                                                                                                
- For a more detailed and formal explanation see Greene ( 2003) and Gujarati (2003) 
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Where F is the corresponding probability density function, for the probit model f is 
given by the standard normal density function     
 
           

 ′−=′Φ 2)(
2
1exp
2
1)( XX βπβ                                          (5.9) 
 
The density function F )( Xβ ′ can be thought of as a scale factor that translates raw 
parameter estimates into marginal effects. 
The marginal effects or slopes transform the results to show how a change in one 
of the explanatory variables affects the probability that an individual will choose to 
participate in the labor market or go on welfare. These marginal effects have important 
implications for various welfare reforms and policy, for instance knowing the decision to 
work is not influenced by the effective welfare tax rates can assist policy makers to 
realize that changes to taxes will have a very small impact  on welfare recipients. 
 
5.3.2 Variances for the Marginal Effects 
Since the marginal effects have to be determined the corresponding standard 
errors also have to be calculated. The standard errors can be found by first estimating the 
variances then finding their square roots. The variances for the marginal effects are 
calculated using the linear approximation method (delta method) suggested by Greene 
(2003). 
The asymptotic covariance matrix for the marginal effects will be given by: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]XXVXXXXVarAsy ′′−′′−′Φ=′Φ βββββββ ˆ)ˆ(1ˆ)ˆ(1)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(. 2                          (5.10) 
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 5.4 Bivariate Probit Model  
 
We employ a bivariate analysis when we want to know if two variables or 
phenomena are associated. An association is said to exist between two variables when 
knowing the value of one for a given case improves the odds of our guessing correctly 
the corresponding value of the second. A full information maximum likelihood estimate 
of the bivariate probit model is used to estimate models (5.1) and (5.2) above jointly. 
Based on the relationships among joint, conditional and marginal probabilities, the 
probabilities of the above equations would be determined in the following manner, 
Greene (1997). 
 
     Take W= Welfare  
              LF= Labor force participation                                             
                     
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
}[ ]{ [ ]1Pr1Pr/)1,(
1Pr11Pr
1,1Pr
=×===
=×===
==
LFobLFobLFWBVN
LFobLFWob
LFWob
                    (5.3)        
Therefore given the probability of welfare participation and the probability labor force 
participation is equal to one the bivariate probability will be given by:  
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   )(*)](),,([]1,1[Pr 2221 XXXLFXBVNLFWob ααραγβ ′Φ′Φ′+′===          (5.4) 
 
Where )( 2Xα′Φ  is the univariate probit model for Labor Force participation (LF) which 
can also be the marginal probability of LF =1. BVN is bivariate normal distribution. 
Canceling the like terms in the denominator and the numerator, we are left with the 
bivariate probability. 
 
                   [ ]1,1Pr == LFWob ραγβ −′−′= ,,( 21 XXBVN )                              (5.5) 
 
 
The other cases will be determined in the same manner and the bivariate probabilities of 
the remaining cases are (Greene, 1997) 
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Chapter 6 
 
Estimation Results and Interpretation 
 
In this chapter, we assess our estimated results against the theoretical discussion 
presented in Chapter 3 and 4. Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are estimated by joint bivariate and 
binary probit models; the results are obtained and interpreted. These results are used to 
provide a brief discussion of welfare differentials between Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
We also compare our results against other Canadian studies. In the explanation of the 
results we put more emphasis on welfare. 
 
 6.1 Estimation Results  
 
6.1.1 Discussion of the Results 
The results of the bivariate probit model are presented in the appendix since the 
model did not performed as expected; we instead present the results of the binary probit 
models which generally perform as expected. The results of the bivariate probit model 
were dropped because the correlation coefficient (ρ) was not significant. Greene (1998) 
indicates that if the correlation coefficient in the bivariate model is not significant the 
individual probit models provide efficient and unbiased estimates. The marginal effects 
are presented as well as the T-statistics in parentheses; the marginal effects give the 
effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the probability of participation in either 
welfare or labor force. The variables with asterisks indicate their level of significance, an 
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explanatory variable is said to be statistically significant if at a given level of α, we 
reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative.  In interpretation of the results; a 
positive marginal effect means that the probability of welfare or labor market 
participation increases while a negative marginal effect indicates the opposite.  
 
Table 6.1 Welfare and Labor Force Participation Results for the Lone Parents, 
Probit Model (Dependent Variable: Participant =1 or 0 Otherwise) 
 
        SASKATCHEWAN ALBERTA  
 
  
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Welfare 
Participation 
LFP Welfare 
Participation 
LFP 
Policy Variables 
   Basic assistance (G) 0.00009*** 
(23.269) 
-0.00002*** 
(9.404) 
0.00006*** 
(12.072) 
-0.000001 
(0.699) 
   Marginal tax 0.0002 
(0.032) 
0.1721 
(1.522) 
0.3232*** 
(6.301) 
-0.0088 
(0.206) 
Demographic  Variables  
Age (base group 25-34) 
  18-24 0.1441** 
(2.096) 
-0.1290*** 
(2.788) 
-0.0887** 
(2.032) 
0.0282 
(0.806) 
  35-44 -0.1063* 
(1.761) 
0.0342 
(0.828) 
0.0758* 
(1.908) 
-0.0548 
(1.849) 
  45-64 -0.1542 
(1.606) 
0.0905 
(1.361) 
0.2050*** 
(3.349) 
-0.0248 
(0.514) 
Number of Children 
  Age< 7 0.2196 
(0.937) 
-0.1121*** 
(7.484) 
0.0148 
(0.972) 
-0.0041 
(0.346) 
  Age7 to 17 -0.0229 
(1.355) 
0.0232** 
(2.033) 
0.0083 
(0.685) 
0.0015 
(0.166) 
 SEX (Base- Female) -0.0789 
(1.247) 
0.1814 
(1.261) 
0.0358 
(1.191) 
0.0234 
(-0.979) 
Human Capital Variables 
Education(base Elementary) 
 High school 0.2674*** 
(4.811) 
0.0385 
(1.007) 
-0.0352 
(1.573) 
0.1117*** 
(6.158) 
 Diploma, trades        
certificate 
0.0965 
(1.179) 
0.1036* 
(1.951) 
-0.0755** 
(2.935) 
0.1352*** 
(6.618) 
 University 0.0914 
(0.634) 
0.1116 
(1.292) 
-0.1297** 
(2.731) 
   0.1265*** 
(4.471) 
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Table 6.1 Continued     
 Experience -0.0394*** 
(3.947) 
     0.0217*** 
(3.236) 
-0.0125** 
(2.307) 
0.0052 
(1.201) 
 Experience Squared -0.0006*** 
(3.546) 
0.0001 
(0.987) 
0.0001 
(1.592) 
-0.0001 
(1.430) 
Other Economic Variables 
geaLnw ˆ  -0.7244*** 
(3.178) 
0.5875*** 
(3.875) 
-0.0903 
(1.506) 
0.0541 
(1.124) 
  Non-labor Income 
 
-0.00002** 
(2.336) 
-0.000003 
(0.984) 
-0.000009 
(1.333) 
0.0000001 
(0.067) 
  Employment 
    Insurance 
0.000005 
(0.604) 
0.00002*** 
(2.826) 
-0.000001 
(0.269) 
-0.000002 
(0.481) 
 Unemployment  
    Rate 
0.0632** 
(2.827) 
-0.0066 
(0.453) 
-0.0057 
(0.777) 
-0.0145** 
(2.388) 
Others 
   Residence  0.0938*** 
(3.171) 
0.0157 
(0.761) 
0.0442** 
(2.106) 
-0.0324* 
(1.837) 
   Immigration  
    Status 
0.0053 
(0.084) 
-0.0313 
(0.629) 
0.0398 
(1.469) 
-0.0046 
(0.209) 
   Constant 2.8718** 
(2.222) 
-2.9439*** 
(3.407) 
0.5345 
(1.613) 
-0.0790 
(0.290) 
   Year  - - 0.0879*** 
(3.344) 
0.0854*** 
(4.654) 
 
SAMPLE 2717 2717 3689 3689 
Mean of dependent  
Variable 
0.3194 
 
0.7030 
 
0.2140 
 
0.7788 
 
Log-Likelihood -541.680 -1258.571 -354.594 -1861.099 
Note: Base group would be a single mother age 25-34 with elementary education and 
living in the rural area.  
        T-stats in the Parenthesis- 
        Estimated Parameters are evaluated at the mean 
        *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
          ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
            * Statistically significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.2 Welfare and Labor Force Participation Results for the Singles, Probit 
Model (Dependent Variable: Participant=1 or 0 Otherwise) 
 
        SASKATCHEWAN ALBERTA  
  
  
 
Explanatory  
Variables 
Welfare 
Participation 
LFP Welfare 
Participation 
    LFP 
Policy Variables 
   Basic Assistance (G) 0.000006*** 
(2.711) 
-0.0000002 
(0.004) 
0.00001*** 
(6.398) 
-0.00004*** 
(12.216) 
   Marginal tax 0.7292 
(0.302) 
-0.0329 
(0.704) 
0.1590*** 
(5.258) 
0.0858 
(1.079) 
Demographics  
Age (base group 25-34) 
  18-24 -0.0018 
(0.157) 
0.0010 
(0.621) 
0.000004 
(0.012) 
0.0022 
(0.111) 
  35-44 -0.0085 
(0.583) 
-0.0264 
(1.356) 
-0.0120 
(1.299) 
-0.1301*** 
(4.384) 
  45-64 0.0019 
(0.164) 
-0.0075 
(0.464) 
-0.0060 
(0.521) 
-0.0505 
(1.091) 
 SEX (Base- Female) -0.0063 
(0.671) 
0.0152 
(1.136) 
0.0085 
(0.258) 
0.0107 
(0.992) 
Human Capital Variables 
Education ( base Elementary) 
 High school -0.0159 
(1.421) 
0.0279* 
(1.772) 
-0.0026 
(0.627) 
0.0043 
(0.287) 
 Diploma,  trades        
certificate 
-0.0112 
(0.842) 
0.0086 
(0.461) 
-0.0053 
(1.182) 
0.0076 
(0.473) 
 University -0.0613** 
(2.239) 
0.0517 
(1.475) 
-0.0056 
(0.764) 
0.0122 
(0.528) 
 Experience -0.0044*** 
(4.057) 
0.0048*** 
(3.079) 
0.0014** 
(1.973) 
0.0096*** 
(2.970) 
 Experience Squared -0.00004* 
(1.927) 
-0.0001*** 
(3.361) 
-0.00001 
(1.070) 
-0.0002*** 
(2.841) 
Other Economic Variables 
geaLnw ˆ  -0.0424** 
(2.194) 
0.0031 
(0.107) 
-0.0032 
(0.534) 
0.0304 
(1.265) 
Non-labor Income -0.000008* 
(1.654) 
0.000002 
(0.750) 
-0.0000005 
(0.313) 
0.0000008 
(0.238) 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
Other Economic Variables  
Continued 
   Employment 
   Insurance 
-0.000002 
(0.910) 
-0.000002 
(0.537) 
-0.000003** 
(2.312) 
0.000002 
(0.537) 
  Unemployment  
   rate 
    0.0170*** 
(2.648) 
-0.0075 
(0.832) 
0.0003 
(0.180) 
-0.0004 
(0.090) 
Others 
   Residence  0.0033 
(0.321) 
-0.0295 
(0.199) 
0.0027 
(0.460) 
-0.0187 
(0.951) 
   Immigration  
    Status 
-0.0009 
(0.047) 
0.0020 
(0.071) 
0.0015 
(0.308) 
0.0036 
(0.213) 
   Constant 0.1151 
(0.915) 
0.3766** 
(2.011) 
0.0445 
(0.952) 
-0.1043 
(0.540) 
   Year  - - 0.0040 
(0.815) 
-0.0104 
(0.670) 
 
SAMPLE 4996 4996 5000 5000 
Mean of dependent  
Variable 
0.0962 0.7984 0.0880 0.8394 
 
Log-Likelihood -1493.865 -2095.790 -158.7088 -2002.024 
Note: Base group would be a single female age 25-34, elementary education, living in     
the rural area. 
        T-stats in the Parenthesis 
        Estimated Parameters are evaluated at the mean 
          *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
            ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
        * Statistically significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Policy Variables 
6.1.2.1 Basic Assistance (in Dollars) 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, generous benefit levels encourage welfare 
participation but discourage work effort and from the results above we can say that holds 
true. Basic assistance has a significant positive effect on welfare participation among 
lone parents in both provinces. Among Saskatchewan lone parents, the mean of basic 
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assistance is $3494.9315 and the mean probability of welfare participation is 0.31947, if 
welfare increases by $1 welfare participation increases to 0.31956 which is a 0.00009 
change in welfare participation. This translates to 0.009 percent increase in welfare 
participation; given a $100 dollar increase in basic assistance the probability of welfare 
participation will increase by 0.9 percent.  
We have a sample of 2717 lone parents in Saskatchewan; a $100 per year 
increase in basic assistance will translate to 24 more lone parents on welfare. Among 
Alberta lone parents, the mean of basic assistance is 2115.05 and the mean probability of 
welfare participation is 0.21387, if welfare increases by $1 welfare participation 
increases to 0.21393 which is a 0.00006 change in welfare participation. This translates 
to 0.006 percent increase in welfare participation; if basic assistance increases by $100, 
welfare participation will increase by 0.6 percent. We have a sample of 3689 lone 
parents in Alberta; a $100 increase will translate to approximately 22 more lone parents 
on welfare. 
A $100 increase in basic assistance will decrease the probability of labor market 
participation by 0.2 percent among lone parents in Saskatchewan. In Alberta, a $100 
increase in basic assistance will decrease the probability of labor market participation by 
0.001 percent. From the preceding explanation we can conclude that basic assistance 
levels have a greater effect on welfare participation than labor market participation 
decision among lone parents.      
Among the singles, basic assistance levels have the same effect on welfare and 
labor market participation decisions as lone parents. In Saskatchewan, a $100 increase in 
                                                 
15 The mean is used because every thing in the discussion is assessed at the means. The mean provides a 
simple way to asses our results when using the probit model.  
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basic assistance will increase the probability of welfare participation by 0.06 percent and 
decrease the probability of labor market participation by 0.02 percent. In Alberta, a $100 
in basic assistance will increase the probability of welfare participation by 0.1 percent 
and decrease the probability of labor market participation by 0.4 percent.   
The elasticity of welfare participation to basic assistance is 0.98 and 0.59 among 
lone parents and 0.04 and 0.07 among singles in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. 
These elasticities are within the range estimated by other researchers using Canadian 
data but the elasticity on lone parents in Saskatchewan is relatively high. 
 
6.1.2.2 Marginal Tax 
Tax is one of the policy instruments available to the policy makers that can be 
used to encourage labor market participation. In this study marginal taxes have a mixed 
effect on welfare and labor market participation decisions. In Saskatchewan, marginal 
taxes have a positive but insignificant influence on labor market and welfare 
participation decisions among lone parents. Among the singles, marginal taxes are 
statistically insignificant to welfare and labor market participation decisions. The 
insignificant influence on welfare participation might be an indication that many 
individuals on welfare do not combine welfare program and market work. The positive 
influence of labor market participation decisions might have to do with how marginal 
taxes were calculated in this study16. 
                                                 
16  The marginal taxes for individuals not on welfare were presumed to 100%, which might not be the case 
in real sense (there is need for more studies in this area).  
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 In Alberta, marginal taxes have a significant negative impact on welfare 
participation among singles and lone parents, but insignificant effect on labor market 
participation decisions.  
 
 6.1.3 Demographic Variables 
  6.1.3.1 Age  
Relative to the base group (age 25-34), among Saskatchewan lone parents, 
individuals in the age group 18-24 have the highest probability of welfare participation, 
and among Alberta lone parents individuals in the age group 45-64 have the highest 
probability of welfare participation. Conversely, lone parents in the ages 35- 44 have the 
highest probability of labor market participation in both provinces. This can be 
explained by the fact that many of them ( age 35-44) have labor market experience and 
there is also an indication that individuals in this age group have experienced a wage 
increase relative to basic assistance levels, especially lone mothers (Dooley, 1999). In 
addition, lone parents in the age group 35-44 are likely to have older children compared 
to lone parents in ages 18-24 and therefore more likely to be labor market participants.    
Furthermore, we can observe that in Saskatchewan lone parents in age group 35-
44 and 45-64 have a negative probability to welfare participation while in Alberta it is 
the opposite. This can be partly due to the welfare policy inherent and the composition 
of welfare participants in the two provinces.  The Alberta government is very firm on 
ensuring that young people (young parents included) are enrolled into skill development 
programs and face stringent rules when applying for welfare. Saskatchewan, in contrast 
is lenient towards single parents with young children.  
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Singles on the other hand respond differently to welfare and labor market 
participation decisions; individuals in the age group 45-64 have the highest probability 
of welfare participation and also have the lowest probability of labor market 
participation. This can be explained by the fact that many individuals in this age group 
face challenges in either finding jobs or being rehired.  
 
6.1.3.2 Presence of Children 
Children increase the accessibility and reduce the stigma associated with welfare 
participation, (Charette and Meng, 1994). It is expected that younger children will 
increase the probability of welfare participation and reduce the probability of labor 
participation, the reverse holds true for older children. This can be attributed to the fact 
that the provinces are generous towards parents with very young children. Among 
Saskatchewan lone parents, having children less than 7 years of age increases the 
probability of welfare participation by 22 percent and decreases the probability of labor 
market participation by 11percent. Moreover, having children over age 7 to 17 decreases 
the probability of welfare participation by 2 percent and increases the probability of 
labor market participation by 2 percent.  In Alberta, children do not exhibit a strong 
influence on welfare and labor market participation decisions of lone parents as 
compared to Saskatchewan. Children under the age of 7 increase the probability of 
welfare participation by 1percent and decrease the probability of labor market 
participation by 0.4 percent. Children over the age of 7 increase the probability of 
welfare participation by 0.8 percent but increase the probability of labor market 
participation by 0.2 percent.  
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 6.1.3.3 Sex 
As indicated in Chapter 3, females especially lone mothers are more likely to 
participate in welfare compared to males.  In this study, being a male lone parent 
decreases the probability of welfare participation but increases the probability of labor 
market participation in both provinces. The same applies to singles. Being a male lone 
parent decreases the probability of welfare participation by 8 percent and increases 
probability of labor market participation by 6 percent in Saskatchewan. In Alberta, being 
a male lone parent decreases the probability of welfare participation by 4 percent but 
increases the probability of labor market participation by 2 percent. Among the singles, 
being male decreases the probability of welfare participation by 0.6 percent and 0.8 
percent and increases the probability of labor market participation by 0.2 percent and 1 
percent in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively.  
 
6.1.6 Human Capital Variables 
6.1.6.1 Education and Experience 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 education and labor market experience increase the 
probability of labor market participation but decrease the probability of welfare 
participation. Relative to the comparison group of elementary school graduates, 
individuals with higher formal education in all categories considered in this study show 
a considerably lower probability of welfare participation and an increase in probability 
of labor market participation. In addition, the effect of education is considerably stronger 
among Alberta lone parents and single individuals in both provinces compared to 
Saskatchewan lone parents. Experience is a decreasing function of both welfare and 
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labor market participation; in this study experience has a mixed signage but generally 
performs as expected.     
                                                                                                                                                          
6.1.7 Other Economic Variables 
6.1.7.1 Predicted Wages 
 Predicted wages have a negative and significant influence on welfare 
participation and a positive and significant impact on labor market participation. The 
wage elasticities evaluated at the mean are -2.26 and -0.42 for welfare and 0.84 and 0.07 
for labor market participation among Saskatchewan and Alberta lone parents 
respectively. Saskatchewan’s lone parent wage elasticity for welfare is much larger than 
the values by Charrete and Meng (1994) of (-0.38) but less than Dooley’s (1999) of (-1.5) 
and (-3.3) estimated by Christofides et al (1997). Among single people in Saskatchewan 
and Alberta, the elasticity of welfare participation to wage is -0.28 and -0.02 and 
elasticity of labor market participation to wage is 0.07 and 0.02 respectively.  
 
6.1.7.2 Non-labor income 
As suggested in chapter 4 non- labor income has a negative influence on both 
welfare and labor market participation. Moreover, as pointed out by Charette and Meng 
(1994) if child support payments represent a significant portion of the non-labor income 
in the case of lone parents, non-labor income should decrease the probability of welfare 
participation.  The elasticity of welfare participation with respect to non-labor income is 
-0.04 and 0.04 and the elasticity of labor market participation -0.003 and -0.002 among 
lone parents in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. Among the singles, the elasticity 
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of welfare participation with respect to non-labor income is -0.02 and 0.001 and that of 
labor market participation is -0.0002 in Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively.    
 
6.1.7.3 Employment Insurance  
As indicated in Chapter 2, Employment insurance just like any other income 
reduces the social assistance benefits given to an individual. In Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, the total assistance payment given to an individual will reduce by the amount of 
employment insurance benefit. It follows that employment insurance increases the 
probability of welfare participation among lone parents and singles in both provinces, 
although the parameters have mixed signage and not statistically significant. In Chapter 
2, we indicated that welfare cases were highly correlated with unemployment rates in 
Alberta compared to Saskatchewan.   
 
6.1.7.4 Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate controls for economic conditions in the respective 
provinces. As indicated in Chapter 3 and 4 given the state of the economy, in recessions 
we expect increases in welfare participation and the opposite in expansions. Among the 
lone parents, unemployment rate has a significant positive influence on welfare 
participation decision and a negative influence on labor market participation decision. A 
1 percent increase in unemployment rate increases the probability of welfare 
participation by 0.06 and 0.006 percent among Saskatchewan and Alberta lone parents 
respectively. Among single people in Saskatchewan and Alberta unemployment rate has 
a negative effect on labor market participation but a positive effect on welfare 
participation.  A 1 percent increase in unemployment rate will increase the probability of 
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welfare participation by 0.02 and 0.0003 percent and reduce the probability of labor 
participation by 0.008 and 0.0004 percent respectively. In Chapter 2, we indicated that 
welfare cases were highly correlated with unemployment rates in Alberta compared to 
Saskatchewan.  Our results indicate the opposite, unemployment rates have a significant 
influence on the probability of welfare participation in Saskatchewan compared to 
Alberta. This might be an indication of the economic situation in the provinces. Alberta 
experienced a strong economic growth compared to Saskatchewan in the period 
considered in this study. 
 
6.1.8 Others 
6.1.8.1 Residence and Immigration Status  
Our results indicate that living in the urban area increases the probability of 
welfare and labor market participation in Saskatchewan. On the contrary, in Alberta, 
living in the urban area decreases both the probability of welfare and labor market 
participation. 
Canadian born individuals have higher probability of welfare participation and 
labor market participation in both groups although the parameters are not economically 
significant. 
 
6.1.8.2 Fixed Time Effect (Alberta) 
 Changes in the welfare program affected the eligibility criteria. These changes 
were used to encourage labor market participation.  Fixed time effects control for 
changes in eligibility that cannot be captured by the marginal tax and basic assistance. In 
addition, they control for those changes that might have occurred concurrently with 
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changes in marginal taxes and basic assistance.  From our results, fixed time effect has a 
significant influence on welfare and labor market participation decisions among lone 
parents but not singles.  
 
 6.2 Evaluation of the results 
6.2.1 Decomposing the Saskatchewan-Alberta Welfare differential 
The regression results in (Table 6.1 and 6.2) are used to decompose the 
Saskatchewan – Alberta welfare differentials into the explained and the unexplained part. 
This principle (decomposition) follows the same procedure developed by Blinder and 
Oaxaca (1973) to explain wage differentials between men and women. By applying this 
principle, we hope to identify which variables contribute to welfare differentials between 
Saskatchewan and Alberta. We then determine if the identified variables can be used by 
policy makers to influence welfare participation decisions. The variables considered are: 
age, education, basic assistance, marginal taxes, economic variables, experience, sex, 
and children.  
We provide a table showing variables that contribute to an increase in welfare 
participation in Saskatchewan. An example of how the explained differential will be 
determined is given in Table 6.3. 
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6.2.2 Explaining the Gap 
 The welfare differential in the probability of welfare participation between 
Saskatchewan and Alberta will be given by:  
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The explained part gives the difference that we can account for given that there 
are differences in choice variables. The unexplained part gives the difference that we 
cannot account for given that Alberta and Saskatchewan have the same choice variables.  
 
Given the explanatory variables in Equation 5.1 the explained gap will be given 
by:  
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Table 6.3 Mean of Age Composition in the Two Provinces (Lone Parents) 
 
       
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Saskatchewan Alberta 
18-24 
   
0.1991 0.1919 
25-34(base) 0.3051 0.2976 
35-44 0.2845 0.2947 
45-64 0.2113 0.2158 
 
 
  Explained gap due to age17 = ( )SKageABageABage XX −β  
                                       
                            =-0.0887 *(0.1919– 0.1991) +0.0758*(0.2947-0.2845) 
                                + 0.2050*(0.2158-0.2113)  
                             = 0.0106 
 
Therefore given that Alberta and Saskatchewan have the same age composition 
welfare participation differential due to age will be 0.0106 or 1.06%. 
 
  Table 6.4: Total Welfare Participation Gap  
 
Lone parents Singles 
Mean of Saskatchewan 31.94 Mean of Saskatchewan 9.62 
Mean of Alberta  21.40 Mean of Alberta 8.8 
Total Welfare gap 10.54 Total Welfare gap 0.82 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Values in Table 6.5 are determined in the same way. 
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Table 6.5:  Factors Explaining the Gap  
 Lone parents                   Singles 
Explanatory variable Percentage Explanatory variable Percentage 
Basic assistance (G) 8.28 Basic Assistance (G) 0.00083 
Children 0.15 Education 0.074 
Education 0.15 Experience 0.62 
Non- Labor Income 0.15 Immigration 0.009 
Employment Insurance 
Unemployment Rate 
Immigration 
0.0016 
0.49 
0.30 
  
Total  explained  9.52 Total  explained 0.70 
Percentage of the total  
 gap 
90% Percentage of the total  
 gap 
85% 
  
After controlling for the variables constraints considered in this study, the 
variables in Table 6.5 have been found to contribute to the increase in welfare 
participation in Saskatchewan. That is, for instance, if Saskatchewan and Alberta had the 
same basic assistance (G) levels welfare participation rates among lone parents in 
Saskatchewan will be lower by 8.3 percent and the same can be said of the other 
variables. In addition, we can also observe that basic assistance among lone parents 
explains a big proportion of the welfare gap. This might be explained by the fact that 
after the welfare reforms of 1993, the Alberta government reduced welfare payments to 
coincide with those of low income working Albertan’s.  
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6.3 Comparison with other Canadian Studies 
Overall our results are consistent with other Canadian studies with a slight 
variation indicating the disparity of welfare programs across the provinces and data used.  
Charette and Meng (1994); Christofides et al (1997) found that children increase the 
probability of welfare participation and family structure to be  an important factor in 
determining the decision to participate in welfare. In addition, basic assistance (G) has a 
significant positive effect on welfare and a significant negative effect on labor market 
participation. In this study we have found these assertions to be true, we have also seen 
that lone parents with young children ages 7 and under are more likely to be welfare 
participants than labor market participants.  
It is also clear that individuals on social assistance rarely combine social 
assistance with employment (Grey, 2002); from the results we saw that employment 
income has a negative effect on welfare participation. From the results, we can also 
support the observations made by Dooley (1999) that younger mothers have a high 
reliance on welfare compared to older parents.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Comparing welfare participation across provinces is a challenging experience not 
only because of the difference in welfare policies but also finding appropriate data. The 
objective of this thesis has been an attempt to explain the difference in welfare and labor 
market participation between the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. More 
emphasis was put on welfare participation decision because that is where the motivation 
of this study was established. Welfare or labor market participation decision has been 
analyzed through individual probit models. The results were evaluated and then 
decomposed to show which variable constraints explain the differences in welfare 
participation in Saskatchewan and Alberta.  
Alberta has managed  to reduce welfare caseloads unparalleled to any other 
province since 1993 when it introduced welfare reforms; welfare participation has gone 
from 7.3 percent of Alberta’s population to about 1.8 percent in 2003 (see Table 2.1). 
Welfare caseloads in Saskatchewan, in contrast, have continued to represent a moderate 
proportion of the province’s population with a few fluctuations.  
Alberta introduced policies that lowered benefit levels and stringent procedures 
when applying for welfare. Saskatchewan on the other hand was very reluctant to follow 
the same course; this can explain why Saskatchewan received a lot of criticisms to its 
welfare policy.  
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Higher welfare benefit levels and higher marginal tax rates increase the 
probability of welfare participation, theoretical and empirical studies reaffirm this. Our 
results support the former but do not show marginal taxes to have a significant influence 
on welfare participation decisions in Saskatchewan. This might indicate that marginal 
taxes are too high that most welfare recipients do not combine welfare program and 
labor market work. 
Our results also indicate that there exist welfare participation differentials 
between Saskatchewan and Alberta. Basic assistance levels explain much of the welfare 
gap among lone parents and labor market experience among singles. We can also 
identify basic assistance and education as some of the variables that the government can 
use to influence welfare participation decision. For instance, providing incentives for 
young people to go to school (especially those from families on welfare) can help reduce 
welfare demand in the future. Education can also enhance their opportunities and as a 
result channel them to other alternatives. 
We have seen that Alberta has been successful in lowering welfare caseloads. 
Unfortunately, we cannot conclude that if Saskatchewan adopted the welfare policies in 
Alberta it can attain the same results. First, there might be a difference in the population 
composition in the two provinces; for instance in this study we cannot differentiate 
between aboriginal and non-aboriginal population. Secondly, there is no clear 
documentation to show that former welfare recipients are better of after joining the labor 
force. Baker (1997) has suggested that many of the welfare recipients connected to the 
labor market through government sponsored programs lost their jobs when the 
government stopped the funding. Thirdly, from table 2.2, we see a dramatic decline in 
welfare caseload rates in Alberta and at the same time we observe almost similar labor 
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market participation rates (Table 2.1), suggesting that Saskatchewan is not that bad. 
Basing on this explanation, we can conclude that welfare participation differentials 
found in this study may be a reflection of differences in welfare program administration.  
However, there is something that can be learned from the Alberta experience, for 
instance the Saskatchewan government should be very vigilant about ensuring that 
people who are applying for welfare have exhausted other options.  Young people 
especially singles should be encouraged to go to school because we have seen that 
education has a positive influence on labor market participation but a negative influence 
on welfare participation. The Saskatchewan government should strive to assist children 
born in families that utilize welfare to avoid the cycle.  
Generally if the economy is good we expect that welfare participation should 
decline especially among employable individuals.  Policy instruments chosen carefully 
coupled with economic opportunities should discourage welfare participation and 
encourage labor market participation. Creating training and employment opportunities 
should help some of the welfare recipients gets off welfare and become self- reliant just 
as Kapsalis indicates in the excerpt below,  
    . …..that lack of paid work or limited attachment to paid work are  
   common factors among the low income and SA recipients, the main  
   focus should be on providing employment services (such as referrals  
   and employment counseling coupled with more generous treatment of  
   earnings under SA and wage subsidies to those able to work a  
   significant number of paid hours (Kapsalis, 1996) 
 
 In addition, Solow (1998) suggests mixing work and welfare with adequate 
supply of jobs to encourage both self-reliance and public support of the system. 
However, he cautions that such a system will not come cheaply.   
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Focusing only on reducing caseloads will not solve the problem, long term 
solutions have to be sought and that is where the challenge lies.  Social programs are 
designed to assist individuals become self-reliant but there is no specific formula to go 
about it. Finally, Solow (1998) asserts that the no matter how expensive the welfare 
system is it is a necessary component of society. It helps reduce the problem of 
homelessness, child hunger and many other social problems that might arise due to lack 
and it is imperative that it is supported.  
 
Future Research Proposals  
Moffitt (1992) clearly sums up everything “Welfare participation decision is an 
economic decision based on labor supply considerations.” Given that this is case, I 
would suggest that future research employs a bivariate analysis of welfare and labor 
participation using actual data from provincial welfare departments. I think this analysis 
would provide superior results compared to the ones presented here. Moreover, pooling 
the data together (Saskatchewan and Alberta) and using a dummy variable to identify the 
provinces would be a valid idea. Secondly, the incidence of welfare participation is 
considered high among lone parents; welfare participation needs to be modeled jointly 
with marital and fertility behavior especially among single mothers. Careful attention 
should be given to the impact of spousal payment or alimony also referred to as ‘other 
income’ on the probability of welfare participation. In addition how does the cost of 
finding employment and child care cost contribute to the decision to be labor market or 
welfare participants? 
Another important area would be to study the dynamics of welfare participation 
in Saskatchewan. Studies on dynamics of welfare focus on determining welfare spells 
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among different social demographic groups. These studies are used to characterize the 
behavior of welfare recipients and hence identifying the high risk groups. Such a study 
will be beneficial to Saskatchewan, not only because it will help the government to 
determine the high risk groups but also formulate policies targeted to those groups.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Bivariate Probit Results Welfare and Labor Market Participation (Dependent Variable participant = 1 or 0 
otherwise) 
 
   Saskatchewan
M.E 
(Standard errors) 
Alberta  
M.E 
(Standard Errors) 
 Singles  Lone Parents  Singles  Lone Parents  
Variable Welfare  LFP Welfare  LFP Welfare  LFP Welfare  LFP 
Age 18 0.00047 
(0.00038) 
-0.00018 
(0.0002) 
0.9470 
(25.0749) 
-0.4390*** 
(0.1455) 
-0.9888 
(6.0775) 
-0.00074 
(0.1128) 
-0.5015 
(3.5236) 
-0.1927 
(0.1224) 
Age 35 0.0035 
(0.1654) 
0.0387 
(0.1109) 
-0.4211 
(18.7337) 
0.1382 
(0.1315) 
-0.5796 
(16.0937) 
-0.0501 
(0.1827) 
0.4571 
(5.3545) 
0.2246** 
(0.1134) 
Age 45 0.0106 
(0.3784) 
0.1494 
(0.1617) 
-0.8420 
(31.9209) 
0.3221 
(0.2137) 
-0.6990 
(13.1380) 
0.2068 
(0.2184) 
0.6119 
(15.8932) 
0.2976 
(0.1891) 
Residence  -0.5237
(0.0931) 
0.1156 
(0.0601) 
-0.5382 
(8.5395) 
0.1323** 
(0.0636) 
-0.0297 
(6.2820) 
0.2659*** 
(0.0805) 
0.0779 
(1.7108) 
0.2857*** 
(0.0608) 
Basic assistance  0.0013 
(0.00002) 
-0.00013 
(0.000039) 
0.00059 
(0.0016) 
-0.000076**
(0.00003) 
0.0013 
(0.0028) 
-0.00015** 
(0.000006 
0.00037* 
(0.00022) 
-0.000013 
(0.000031) 
Child07  - - 0.6834
(1.1823) 
-0.3222*** 
(0.05023) 
- - 0.1460 -0.2300*** 
(0.9782) (0.04392) 
Child717      - - -0.2542
(2.3446) 
0.0769* 
(0.0385) 
- - -0.0139 -0.0012 
(1.2955) (0.0355) 
Diploma  0.0016
(0.1165) 
-0.0526 
(0.0772) 
3.0359 
(6.1794) 
0.1537** 
(0.0911) 
-0.2593 
(4.5909) 
0.0341 
(0.0708) 
0.1794 
(2.1803) 
0.1175 
(0.0716) 
Employment 
Insurance 
-0.00065 
(0.00002) 
0.000093 
(0.000009) 
-0.00031 
(0.0015) 
0.00006*** 
(0.000013) 
-0.00002 
(0.0011) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00001 
(0.0007) 
0.000016 
(0.00002) 
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Table A1 Continued 
Experience  0.00021 
(0.0121) 
-0.0087 
(0.0123 
0.7610 
(1.7078) 
-0.0337 
(0.0196) 
0.0472 
(0.8543) 
-0.0111 
(0.0170) 
-0.0593 
(0.6199) 
-0.0319** 
(0.0179) 
Experience 
squared  
-0.0026 
(0.0004) 
-0.00032 
(0.0002) 
-0.0110 
(0.0706) 
-0.00033 
(0.3107) 
-0.00047 
(0.0125) 
-0.0633** 
(0.2448) 
0.00061 
(0.0247) 
-0.00019 
(0.00032) 
High school 0.0016 
(0.1121) 
-0.0208 
(0.0758) 
0.0664 
(10.8760) 
0.3775*** 
(0.0855) 
-0.0629 
(4.7424) 
0.0334 
(0.0668) 
0.2212 
(2.0781) 
0.03498 
(0.0680) 
Immigration 
status  
-0.0027 
(0.1520) 
-0.0197 
(0.1106) 
-0.5453 
(158.7352) 
-0.1011 
(0.1564) 
-1.8254 
(14.6596) 
0.1422* 
(0.0771) 
-0.0860 
(3.7448) 
0.07921 
(0.0900) 
Log  wage -0.0141 
(0.0885) 
0.1826 
(0.0737) 
-3.6211 
(20.3614) 
0.3069*** 
(0.0773) 
-0.3211 
(1.7361) 
0.1810* 
(0.0289) 
-0.5560 
(1.4074) 
0.2348*** 
(0.0608) 
Other Income -0.00049 
(0.00008) 
-0.0000059 
(0.0000063) 
0.00010 
(0.0033) 
-0.000015 
(0.000012) 
-0.00004 
(0.0027) 
-0.00004***
(0.000008 
-0.00009 
(0.00049) 
-0.00002*** 
(0.000008) 
Program tax 0.1572 
(0.2148) 
-0.1362 
(0.2700) 
0.9263 
(11.0942) 
-0.3957 
(0.4404) 
0.0112 
(0.2600) 
0.0054 
(0.4142) 
5.5775** 
(2.2395) 
-1.0815** 
(0.4372) 
Sex -0.0012 -0.0840 
(0.0656) (0.0576) 
0.4176 
(5.2386) 
-0.2598*** 
(0.0773) 
-0.0096 
(2.6685) 
-0.0667 
(0.0523) 
0.2942 
(3.4678) 
-0.3662 
(0.0759) 
University  0.0055
(0.1456) 
-0.07102 
(0.1135) 
3.0421 
(1033.5212) 
0.3454* 
(0.1829) 
-0.4357 
(6.8309) 
0.0274 
(0.1137) 
0.4523 
(2.6143) 
-0.1039 
(0.1079) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.0129 
(0.0653) 
-0.01570 
(-0.0548) 
0.8488 
(0.0496) (5.7444) 
-0.0423 
(1.0005) 
-0.0093 
(0.0160) 
0.0558 
(0.6370) 
0.0177 
(0.0215) 
Rho(1,2), ρ 
(Stdard Error) 
( T-stat) 
-0.1777 
(0.1176 
(-0.016) 
-0.9996 
(4.7570) 
  (-0.2101)  
-0.3065 
(2.3347) 
(-0.131) 
-0.9980 
(1.3702) 
(-0.7281) 
 
 
 
Sample 4996    2717 5000 3686
Log likelihood -3549.358    -1961.683 -1723.312 -1723.312
-0.2682 
 
Note 
  *** 1% significant level          ** 5% significant level    * 10% significant level 
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Table A2: Welfare Incomes 
 
Year 1986 1987 1989 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Saskatchewan                         
Single 
employable              5,777 5,775 5,776 5,779 5,652 5,477 5,692 5,990 5,973 5,852 5,760 5,831
Single Parent, 
One child  11,853 11,803 11,803 11,803 11,475 11,103 10,919 10,796 10,765 10,548 10,381 11,482
Alberta             
Single 
employable              8,220 5,800 5,616 5,711 5,451 5,922 5,973 5,628 4,903 4,804 4,728 5,260
Single Parent, 
One child  12,036 12,024 11,400 10,708 10,222 10,715 10,700 10,271 9,532 9,339 9,192 10,250
     
       Source:  Welfare Incomes, National Council of Welfare. 
 
